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Introduction
This thesis contains three chapters, each dealing with a specific macroeconomic
topic. While these topics are quite diverse, covering aspects such as international
portfolio holdings, the banking sector, crisis transmission and fiscal policy, there are
still several links between the individual chapters.
The first two chapters both analyze aspects of international macroeconomics,
focusing on trade in goods and financial assets. More specifically, the first chapter
examines how bilateral trade flows and trade openness influence a country’s foreign
asset holdings, and thus risk sharing. The second chapter also takes up linkages via
goods and financial trade, however, it investigates the effects of a decline in trade flows
and the value of foreign asset holdings on macroeconomic activity in the domestic
economy.
The second and third chapter also share a common theme. Both study business
cycle fluctuations and, in particular, the factors contributing to macroeconomic
volatility. In the second chapter, these forces originate in the rest of the world,
whereas in the third chapter internal forces - in particular fiscal policy - contribute to
macroeconomic fluctuations.
Chapter 1.1 The first chapter analyzes the relationship between bilateral trade,
trade openness, and asset holdings theoretically, using a three-country model, as
well as empirically, providing evidence for the influence of both bilateral trade and
trade openness on bilateral asset holdings. The three-country model set-up enables
1This chapter is based on the paper “Bilateral Trade Flows, Openness, and Asset Holdings” (Peter,
forthcoming).
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me to disentangle the effects of bilateral trade flows and trade openness on bilateral
portfolio patterns. The change to a three-country model is crucial as bilateral trade
flows and openness are inseparably intertwined in the two-country case, which makes
it impossible to analyze the individual effects.
The analysis shows that bilateral trade and trade openness both have independent
effects on bilateral asset holdings. Higher bilateral trade as well as higher trade
openness lead to a higher bilateral foreign asset position. Furthermore, the model
shows an interaction effect between these two factors, where increasing trade openness
reduces the influence of bilateral trade flows on asset holdings. These theoretical
findings are supported by empirical evidence using a data set on the geographical
composition of international portfolio holdings.
Chapter 2.2 The next chapter explores the relative importance of the trade
and financial channel in spreading the financial crisis of 2007-2009 to Germany.
Specifically, we calibrate a DSGE model of a small open economy with a banking
sector to Germany. The model economy is integrated with the rest of the world
through trade in goods and through the banking sector trading foreign assets. We
then use this model to investigate the transmission via the collapse of export demand
and through the declined value of U.S. securities in possession of the German banking
system.
The model is successful in predicting 95% of the observed decline in real output in
the beginning of 2009. The trade channel is responsible for 70% of this movement,
while the financial channel explains the remaining 30%. However, transmission via the
financial channel triggers a longer-lasting recession than the trade channel, thereby
prolonging the crisis in Germany.
Chapter 3.3 The third chapter investigates the role of news about fiscal policy,
and in particular the anticipation of tax rate changes for macroeconomic fluctuations.
While recent macroeconomic research has started to analyze the effects of anticipated,
or news, shocks on business cycle fluctuations, most empirical studies have focused on
news about future productivity, but have paid little attention to fiscal news (see e.g.
2This chapter is based on joint work with Zeno Enders, “The International Transmission of the
Financial Crisis - A German Perspective” (Enders and Peter, 2011).
3This chapter is based on joint work with Benjamin Born and Johannes Pfeifer, “Fiscal News and
Macroeconomic Volatility” (Born et al., 2011).
2
Forni et al., 2011; Fujiwara et al., 2011; Khan and Tsoukalas, 2011; Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe, 2010). However, fiscal news hold the potential for explaining aggregate
fluctuations. First, fiscal measures are usually publicly debated long before they
become enacted or effective. Second, surprise fiscal policy shocks have long been
discussed as a potential prominent driver of the business cycle (see e.g. Baxter
and King, 1993; Cardia et al., 2003; Jones, 2002; McGrattan, 1994). This chapter
adds upon the previous literature by explicitly analyzing the business cycle variance
contribution of fiscal news. For this purpose, we employ an estimated New Keynesian
DSGE model featuring several real and nominal rigidities as well as various shocks
identified as important drivers of the business cycle.
While fiscal policy accounts for 12 to 20 percent of output variance at business cycle
frequencies, the anticipated component hardly matters for explaining fluctuations of
real variables. Anticipated capital tax shocks do explain a sizable part of inflation and
interest rate fluctuations, accounting for between 5 and 15 percent of total variance.
Consistent with earlier studies, we find that, in total, news shocks account for 20
percent of output variance, driven by news about stationary TFP and non-stationary
investment-specific technology.
3

Chapter1
Bilateral Trade Flows, Openness, and
Asset Holdings
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, cross-border asset holdings have risen strongly. But despite
increasing international financial integration, equity and bond holdings still differ
widely across countries. This stands in contrast to economic theory, which predicts
that in a fully integrated frictionless world cross-border portfolios should be identical
across countries (see e.g. Lucas, 1982), leading to the question which factors determine
the size and geographical composition of these varying portfolios. The factors can be
grouped along two lines, size of foreign asset position and geographical composition,
and have been studied extensively in the literature. The size of the foreign asset
position is determined, inter alia, by trade openness. Countries that are more open
to trade, measured as total exports plus imports, hold larger foreign asset positions
(see e.g. Aizenman and Noy, 2009; Heathcote and Perri, 2009; Lane, 2000).1 On
the other hand, bilateral trade is one of the factors that govern the geographical
composition of the foreign asset position.2 Both Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) report that bilateral trade flows have a positive impact
1Other factors that influence the aggregate foreign asset position are economic size and financial
development (see Heathcote and Perri, 2009; Lane, 2000; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004).
2Other factors are, e.g., informational and cultural linkages.
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on bilateral asset holdings. However, these studies have either focused solely on trade
openness and the size of foreign asset positions or on bilateral trade patterns and
the composition of foreign asset positions, but have not looked at the combination of
both.
In this chapter, I take up this issue and analyze the relationship between bilateral
trade, trade openness, and asset holdings theoretically, using a three-country model,
as well as empirically, providing evidence for the influence of both bilateral trade and
trade openness on bilateral asset holdings. To study the effects of trade openness
and bilateral trade flows in a unified framework, I build a three-country/three-good
general equilibrium model consisting of simple endowment economies with home bias
in consumption due to households preferring the home good over foreign goods.3 The
change to a three-country model is crucial as bilateral trade flows and openness are
inseparably intertwined in the two-country case. As a result higher openness can
only be obtained by higher bilateral trade, since there are no other trading partners.
Conversely, increasing the bilateral trade between the two countries inevitably raises
their trade openness. Hence, it is impossible to analyze the individual effects of
bilateral and total trade on the foreign portfolio share. This has the consequence
that in a two-country set-up the focus has to be either on the effect of trade openness
or the effect of bilateral trade. In contrast, with three countries both effects can
be studied in a unified framework. I can vary bilateral trade flows while holding
the openness of a country constant. That way it is possible to distinguish explicitly
between the influence of bilateral trade flows and the influence of openness on the
geographical composition of the foreign asset position. In addition, I can identify
possible interaction effects between bilateral trade and trade openness.
In order to keep the theoretical model simple and tractable, I follow Lucas (1982),
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), Kollmann (2006), and Heathcote and Perri (2009) in
assuming complete financial markets and full risk-sharing. That way it is possible
to first characterize the optimal social planner consumption allocation and then
identify the asset allocation that replicates this optimal consumption allocation in a
3Home bias in consumption is commonly used in the vast literature analyzing portfolio home bias.
Consumption home bias is either introduced through preferences (see e.g. Coeurdacier et al.,
2007; Kollmann, 2006) or through trade costs (see e.g. Coeurdacier, 2009; Obstfeld and Rogoff,
2001).
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decentralized setting, where only a restricted set of assets is available.
Turning to the results, first, they show that bilateral trade and trade openness both
have independent effects on bilateral asset holdings. Holding either one constant, while
varying the other one, gives a distinct pattern for the bilateral foreign asset position.
The sign of the effect of bilateral trade flows, but also of trade openness, depends on the
elasticity of substitution between consumption goods. The elasticity of substitution
in combination with the trade pattern drives the responses of international relative
prices to endowment shocks and, through this, determines the portfolio allocation. For
relatively small values of the elasticity of substitution, higher trade flows between two
countries lead, ceteris paribus, to higher asset holdings between these two countries.
For higher values of the elasticity of substitution, the opposite pattern emerges: higher
trade flows lead to smaller asset holdings of the trade partner’s stock. Kollmann
(2006) also stresses the importance of the elasticity of substitution in his two-country
model. But in using a three-country set-up, I am able to show that bilateral trade
flows have an independent effect even when holding openness constant.
Second, my results indicate that, ceteris paribus, bilateral investment positions are
larger for higher degrees of openness. In this case, stronger terms-of-trade reactions in
response to endowment shocks rationalize higher asset holdings, given terms-of-trade
effects on consumption expenditures. This particular feature of the model emerges
for parameter constellations where home and foreign goods are complements.
Third, I find an interaction effect between bilateral trade and openness. Comparing
the influence of bilateral trade flows on asset holdings for different values of openness
shows that the effect of bilateral trade flows on equity holdings is smaller for higher
trade openness. Intuitively, equity shares of the trading partner are less important
for risk sharing if there is a lot of trade with other countries.
Furthermore, I provide empirical evidence that both bilateral trade flows as well
as total trade flows influence bilateral asset holdings positively and significantly.
For this purpose, I employ a gravity model to estimate the influence of bilateral
trade and trade openness on bilateral asset holdings.4 The basis for this analysis is
4Gravity models are traditionally used in the international trade literature, but are now also widely
used to explain international investment patterns of equity holdings (e.g. Aviat and Coeurdacier,
2007; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Portes and Rey, 2005; Sarisoy Guerin, 2006), bank lending
(e.g. Rose and Spiegel, 2004) and foreign direct investment (e.g., Mody et al., 2002).
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the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which provides the geographical composition of security investments
of up to 74 source countries.5 I include both bilateral and total trade flows in my
analysis of bilateral investment patterns. While bilateral trade flows have been found
to be a major determinant of bilateral cross-border asset holdings (see Aviat and
Coeurdacier, 2007; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008), total trade flows as a measure for
trade openness have only been used to explain aggregate foreign asset positions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the three-country
stochastic general equilibrium model and its solution. In section 3, the resulting
optimal portfolios for differing trade patterns are analyzed. Section 4 covers the
empirical analysis of bilateral asset holdings, while section 5 concludes.
1.2 A Three-Country Model
1.2.1 Model Set-Up
I use a two-period variant of the model by Kollmann (2006) and extend it to a
three-country set-up. The three countries are indexed by i = 1, 2, 3 and each is
exogenously endowed with a distinct national good, Yi. The economies are linked
internationally by trade in goods and equities and exist for two periods (t = 0, 1).6 In
the first period (t = 0), only equity shares, which are claims to the future endowment
of a particular country, are traded. In period t = 1, the endowment process is
realized and the representative household trades goods, settles the equity claims, and
consumes. The only source of uncertainty in this model is the stochastic endowment
process, which is symmetric across countries. I assume E0[Yi] = 1, for i = 1, 2, 3,
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator given information at date t = 0.
5Source country residents hold security investments, which are issued by destination country
residents, and report these holdings in the CPIS.
6Variables without a time subscript correspond to period t = 1.
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Preferences
Each country i is inhabited by a representative household, who has the following
utility function
U(Ci) = E0
[
(Ci)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ
]
, ρ > 0, (1.1)
where ρ represents the relative risk aversion parameter and Ci is the aggregate
consumption index:
Ci =
[
(αi1)
1
θ (ci1)
θ−1
θ + (αi2)
1
θ (ci2)
θ−1
θ + (αi3)
1
θ (ci3)
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 for i = 1, 2, 3. (1.2)
Here, cij denotes consumption in country i of good j and αij is the corresponding
weight parameter for that particular good. Note that ∑3j=1 αij = 1 and country i has
a home bias in consumption if 13 < α
i
i ≤ 1. The elasticity of substitution between any
two goods is θ.7
Introducing pj as the price of good j, the consumption based price index for country
i is
Pi =
(
αi1 + αi2(p2)1−θ + αi3(p3)1−θ
) 1
1−θ for i = 1, 2, 3. (1.3)
Note that good 1 is chosen as the numéraire and, thus, p1 is set to unity. Hence,
the prices p2 and p3 can be interpreted as the terms-of-trade of country 1 vis-à-vis
countries 2 and 3, respectively.
Financial Markets
There is international trade in equity shares, Sij, which are claims of country i to
a fraction of the future endowment of country j. Each share of stock j entitles the
owner to a dividend payment. The size of this payment is determined by the value of
country j’s endowment, pjYj.
The supply of equity shares is normalized to unity such that market clearing in
the asset market requires
S1j + S2j + S3j = 1 for j = 1, 2, 3. (1.4)
7Assuming θ = 1, aggregate consumption is of Cobb-Douglas type and αij represents the expenditure
share spent for consumption of good j in country i.
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At the beginning of period 0, country i has zero foreign assets, Sij,0 = 0 (i 6= j),
and holds all local shares, Sii,0 = 1. With qj,0 being the price of stock j in period 0,
the budget constraint of country i for period 0 takes the following form:
q1,0S
i
1 + q2,0Si2 + q3,0Si3 = qi,0 for i = 1, 2, 3. (1.5)
In the rest of the chapter, the portfolio of country i will be the triple (Si1, Si2, Si3).
Household Maximization
In period 1, after uncertainty has been realized and dividends have been distributed,
the representative household in country i decides on consumption, cij , taking as given
his portfolio of equity shares. The budget constraint for period 1 is
ci1 + p2ci2 + p3ci3 = Si1Y1 + Si2p2Y2 + Si3p3Y3 for i = 1, 2, 3, (1.6)
i.e., consumption expenditures equal portfolio income. Maximizing the utility of
country i’s representative household, equation (1.1), subject to the budget constraint
for period 1 yields the following first-order conditions for consumption:
(
Ci
) 1
θ
−ρ
(
ci1
αi1
)− 1
θ
= λi, (1.7)
(
Ci
) 1
θ
−ρ
(
ci2
αi2
)− 1
θ
= λip2, (1.8)
(
Ci
) 1
θ
−ρ
(
ci3
αi3
)− 1
θ
= λip3, (1.9)
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier on the period 1 budget constraint of country
i. After characterizing how the household income is optimally allocated across
consumption goods, the next step is to explore the income side, i.e., the equity
portfolio allocation.
In period 0, no production or consumption takes place, but the representative
household decides on the amount of equity shares he wants to hold. When deciding
on the asset portfolio the agent takes into account his consumption plan for period
10
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1 and that his financial income is uncertain. Let λi0 be the Lagrange multiplier on
the budget constraint of period 0 in country i. The representative agent of country i
maximizes his utility, equation (1.1), subject to the budget constraints for periods 0
and 1, equations (1.5) and (1.6). This gives the following first order conditions for
equity shares:
λi0q1,0 = E0
(Ci) 1θ−ρ ( ci1
αi1
)− 1
θ
Y1
 , (1.10)
λi0q2,0 = E0
(Ci) 1θ−ρ ( ci1
αi1
)− 1
θ
p2Y2
 , (1.11)
λi0q3,0 = E0
(Ci) 1θ−ρ ( ci1
αi1
)− 1
θ
p3Y3
 . (1.12)
These equations show that the demand for equity shares depends on the purchase
price in period 0 and the asset return in period 1.
Equilibrium in the Decentralized Economy
Having characterized the set-up of the economy and the household maximization,
the next step is to define the equilibrium in the decentralized economy. The equilibrium
in the decentralized economy is given by a set of quantities ci1, ci2, ci3, Si1, Si2, Si3,
i = 1, 2, 3, and prices p2, p3, q1,0, q2,0, q3,0, such that
1. the FOCs for consumption, equations (1.7)-(1.9),
2. the FOCs for equity shares, equations (1.10)-(1.12), and
3. the budget constraint, equation (1.6), hold and
4. asset markets, equation (1.4), and goods markets, c1j + c2j + c3j = Yj, j = 1, 2, 3,
clear.
1.2.2 Equilibrium with Full Risk-Sharing
As in Lucas (1982), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), Kollmann (2006), and Heathcote
and Perri (2009), I focus on equilibria with full risk-sharing, i.e., Pareto efficient
11
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equilibria. Therefore, I first solve the central planner’s problem to obtain the efficient
consumption allocation. In a next step, I characterize the asset portfolio in a
decentralized economy that supports the efficient consumption allocation. In the
decentralized economy, the number of assets is restricted to three equities. Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2009) show that such a portfolio can replicate the full risk-sharing
allocation up to first order, if the number of shocks equals the number of assets and
the asset pay-offs react to shocks. While the first condition is fulfilled in my model
with three endowment shocks and three assets, I will later encounter some model
calibrations for which the second condition is not fulfilled.
Efficient Consumption Allocation
The efficient allocation is attained through a social planner maximizing the sum of
the countries’ utility functions, where the planner problem is static since consumption
only takes place in period 1:8
max
{c1j , c2j , c3j}
(C1)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ +
(C2)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ +
(C3)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ (1.13)
subject to the resource constraints
c1j + c2j + c3j = Yj for j = 1, 2, 3, (1.14)
and C1, C2, C3 given by equation (1.2).
The first order conditions for consumption of good j are
(
C1
) 1
θ
−ρ
(
c1j
α1j
)− 1
θ
=
(
C2
) 1
θ
−ρ
(
c2j
α2j
)− 1
θ
, (1.15)
(
C1
) 1
θ
−ρ
(
c1j
α1j
)− 1
θ
=
(
C3
) 1
θ
−ρ
(
c3j
α3j
)− 1
θ
. (1.16)
These conditions imply that the marginal utilities from consuming good j are perfectly
positively correlated across countries. From the risk-sharing conditions, equations
8The social planner assigns an equal weight to each country, since the endowment processes are
symmetric across countries.
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(1.15) and (1.16), and the resource constraints, I can compute the efficient consumption
allocation, ci1, ci2, ci3, for i = 1, 2, 3.
To analyze how the efficient consumption allocation responds to endowment shocks,
it is convenient to define µij ≡ cij/Yj . This share µij is the efficient share of good j that
is consumed by country i and shows whether consumption changes proportionally to
an endowment shock or not.
The response of the consumption allocation depends on the relationship between
the elasticity of substitution, θ, and the risk aversion parameter, ρ. For this response,
I can distinguish between three cases. In the first case, 1
ρ
= θ, all consumption shares
remain unchanged after an endowment shock. The linearized risk-sharing conditions
(see Appendix A) imply that consumption of good j has to increase proportionally to
a positive endowment shock to good j, while consumption of the other two goods
does not change.
In the second case, 1
ρ
> θ, consumption shares in country i increase for a positive
endowment shock in country i and fall for a positive endowment shock in one of the
other countries. In this case, the three goods are complements. Therefore, a country
experiencing a positive endowment shock consumes proportionally more of all goods.
In the third case, 1
ρ
< θ, the three goods are substitutes and consumption shares in
a country fall for a shock to the home good and increase for a shock to the foreign
good.9
Decentralizing the Efficient Allocation
Having computed the efficient consumption allocation from the social planner
solution, I can now identify the portfolio allocation that supports this efficient
consumption allocation. To this end, I have to find a set of prices and portfolios, p2,
p3, Si1, Si2, Si3, for i = 1, 2, 3, that together with the efficient consumption allocation,
ci1, ci2, ci3, for i = 1, 2, 3, constitutes an equilibrium.
Substituting the efficient consumption allocation into the first order conditions for
consumption, equations (1.7)-(1.9), yields the relative prices p2 and p3 that pertain
9For the consumption share reactions, home bias plays an important role. Without home bias in
consumption, consumption shares would be constant regardless of the relationship between 1ρ
and θ.
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to the efficient consumption allocation:
p2 =
(
αi1
αi2
ci2
ci1
)− 1
θ
, (1.17)
p3 =
(
αi1
αi3
ci3
ci1
)− 1
θ
for i = 1, 2, 3. (1.18)
The next step is to find the portfolio allocation, Si1, Si2, Si3, for i = 1, 2, 3, that
supports the efficient allocation. Since the budget constraint of each country has
to hold for the portfolio allocation, I can use these constraints to compute the
optimal equity shares. However, to find this portfolio, I have to resort to a linear
approximation since the first order conditions are nonlinear. This is done in the next
section.
1.2.3 Linear Approximation
The model equations are linearized around a symmetric equilibrium where endow-
ments and prices are equal and trade is balanced. Here, xˆ = x−x¯
x¯
denotes percentage
deviations from the symmetric equilibrium, x¯.
Linearizing the period 1 budget constraint for country 1, equation (1.6), and using
the definition for consumption shares, µij, leads to:
µ¯11(µˆ11+Yˆ1)+µ¯12(µˆ12+pˆ2+Yˆ2)+µ¯13(µˆ13+pˆ3+Yˆ3) = S11 Yˆ1+S12(pˆ2+Yˆ2)+S13(pˆ3+Yˆ3). (1.19)
This expression shows that the change in total consumption expenditures in response
to an endowment shock has to be accounted for by a reaction of the portfolio income.
Rearranging equation (1.19) yields:
µ¯11µˆ
1
1 + µ¯12µˆ12 + µ¯13µˆ13 = (S11 − µ¯11)Yˆ1 + (S12 − µ¯12)(pˆ2 + Yˆ2) + (S13 − µ¯13)(pˆ3 + Yˆ3). (1.20)
On the left hand side, I have isolated the change in consumption expenditures in
response to an endowment shock that is due to changes of consumption shares. These
are changes of the efficient consumption allocation that are not proportional to an
endowment shock. The right hand side shows the change in total expenditures that is
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due to changes of relative prices. It shows the change in portfolio income. In order to
analyze the implications of relative price and consumption share responses (discussed
above) for the portfolio allocation, I examine how endowment shocks affect relative
prices.
The terms-of-trade of country 1 correspond to the relative prices p2 and p3. Lin-
earizing equations (1.17) and (1.18) and again using the definition for consumption
shares yields:
pˆ2 = −1
θ
(
µˆi2 + Yˆ2 − µˆi1 − Yˆ1
)
, (1.21)
pˆ3 = −1
θ
(
µˆi3 + Yˆ3 − µˆi1 − Yˆ1
)
for i = 1, 2, 3. (1.22)
With the assumption of efficient risk-sharing, the terms-of-trade of country 1 always
worsen in response to a positive home endowment shock (see Corsetti et al., 2008).
The terms-of-trade of country 2 and country 3 behave in the same way and fall in
response to a positive endowment shock to good 2 and good 3, respectively. Equations
(1.21) and (1.22) further show that the terms-of-trade between two countries can also
change in response to an endowment shock in the third country. For example, assume
a higher endowment in country 3, Yˆ3 > 0, while Yˆ1 = Yˆ2 = 0. If consumption shares
of good 1 and good 2 do not respond in an identical way to this endowment shock,
i.e., µˆi1 6= µˆi2, the terms-of-trade between country 1 and 2 change, pˆ2 6= 0.
1.2.4 Equity Portfolios
In a next step, I solve for equity shares that replicate the efficient consumption
allocation. That means, I compute the portfolio of country 1, S11 , S12 , S13 , such that
its budget constraint, equation (1.20), holds for arbitrary realizations of Yˆ1, Yˆ2, Yˆ3.
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Country 1’s portfolio then has the following form:
S11 = α11 + ∆11 −
Γ1p2
(
∆21(Γ3p3 + 1)−∆31Γ2p3
)
+ Γ1p3
(
∆31(Γ2p2 + 1)−∆21Γ3p2
)
(Γ2p2 + 1)(Γ3p3 + 1)− Γ3p2Γ2p3
, (1.23)
S12 = α12 +
∆21(Γ3p3 + 1)−∆31Γ2p3
(Γ2p2 + 1)(Γ3p3 + 1)− Γ3p2Γ2p3
, (1.24)
S13 = α13 +
∆31(Γ2p2 + 1)−∆21Γ3p2
(Γ2p2 + 1)(Γ3p3 + 1)− Γ3p2Γ2p3
, (1.25)
where ∆i1 summarizes the response of consumption shares in country 1 to an endow-
ment shock in country i and Γipj shows the response of pj to an endowment shock in
country i.10 The portfolios of the other countries can be derived in a similar manner.
However, there are two cases where it is not possible to derive a unique portfolio
of equilibrium asset shares. In the first case, portfolio holdings are indeterminate
and, thus, infinitely many portfolios exist. This case occurs for two parameter
combinations. If the elasticity of substitution is equal to one, θ = 1, and either
the utility function is logarithmic, ρ = 1, or preferences do not exhibit home bias,
αij = 1/3, consumption shares are constant in response to an endowment shock
(∆i1 = 0) and the terms-of-trade fully offset endowment shocks (Γ2p2 = Γ3p3 = −1, see
appendix A). Thus, terms-of-trade changes fully insure against output fluctuations
and financial autarky is efficient (see Cole and Obstfeld, 1991).
In the second case, for some parameter combinations, the given asset structure can-
not replicate the efficient allocation since asset pay-offs are unaffected by endowment
shocks (Γ2p2 − 1 = Γ3p3 − 1 = Γ3p2 = Γ2p3 = 0). The equity pay-offs are not state-
contingent and it is not possible to generate a pay-off structure that replicates the
one for Arrow-Debreu securities. In this case, it it not possible to derive equilibrium
asset shares.
Apart from the two cases just discussed, equations (1.23)-(1.25) specify the equity
portfolio of country 1. The equity shares generate the financial income for arbitrary
realizations of endowment shocks that induce the households to consume according
to the efficient consumption allocation. Therefore, they incorporate the responses
of consumption shares and relative prices to endowment shocks, as these indicate
10For the calculation of ∆i1 and Γipj see appendix A.
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how the efficient consumption allocation and the dividends look like for different
endowment realizations.
The first term in S1j indicates the level of asset holdings, if consumption shares
are constant for all endowment realizations. In this case, the asset share of stock j
corresponds to the share agent 1 consumes of good j (at the point of linearization),
which is equal to the preference weight for good j. Thus, financial income from
these asset holdings suffices for consumption expenditures for good j. If, however,
not only relative prices but also consumption shares react to endowment shocks,
equity shares have to be higher or lower than the consumption weight. Higher asset
holdings of a stock, whose dividend is higher relative to the other stocks, would
induce the representative agent of country 1 to consume a higher output share as
prescribed by efficient risk-sharing. However, I cannot state general conclusions about
the consumption share and terms-of-trade responses and their co-movement, since
they specifically depend on the chosen parameters.
1.3 Results from a Calibrated Model
1.3.1 Calibration
My model is parsimonious in the number of parameters. The parameter for risk
aversion is set to ρ = 2, a standard value in the literature (see e.g. Backus et al.,
1994). The parameter for the elasticity of substitution between home and imported
goods, θ, plays a key role for the division of the portfolio between home and foreign
assets, but also for the effect of bilateral trade flows on the portfolio. However, there
is no consensus on the value of θ with estimates being highly dependent on the data
used. Studies using disaggregated sectoral data usually find higher estimates of 3− 6
(e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2001; Hummels, 2001), while studies using macro data
find lower estimates of 0.23−2. The estimates of Enders and Müller (2009) and Lubik
and Schorfheide (2006) are at the lower end with values of 0.23 and 0.3, respectively,
while Corsetti et al. (2008) find a value of 0.85 and Backus et al. (1994) use one of
1.5. Therefore, I will in a first step analyze how the equilibrium portfolio depends
on θ, θ ∈ [0, 5], given a specific trade pattern. This helps to build intuition for the
portfolio composition, facilitates comparison with two-country models, and motivates
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the choice for θ = 0.3, when analyzing the influence of bilateral trade flows.
In a second step, I will analyze how the portfolio depends on bilateral trade flows.
For this purpose, I consider varying values for the consumption preference parameters
that govern trade flows. The values of the αijs are chosen to pin down the import
share in country 1, α1j + α1k, j 6= k, at 30% of GDP. The exact specifications for αijs
depend on the prespecified trade pattern and will be discussed in subsequent sections.
1.3.2 The Portfolios’ Dependence on the Elasticity of
Substitution
In this section, I study how the substitution elasticity, θ, affects the portfolio
allocation given two specific trade patterns. In what follows, I interpret country 3 as
the rest of the world and focus mostly on the bilateral relationship between country 1
and 2 from the viewpoint of country 1. The two trade patterns analyzed include one
case, where all countries have symmetric preferences regarding the foreign goods, and
one case, where country 1 and 2 have asymmetric preferences regarding the respective
foreign goods. In case 1, the symmetry across the three countries implies that trade
flows between all countries are identical (see table 1.1, case 1).
In the second case, country 1 and 2 are symmetric and import a higher share from
country 3, i.e., the rest of the world, than from the other trading partner. Table 1.1
(case 2) gives the specification for the consumption preference parameters. Note that
country 3 has symmetric preferences for good 1 and 2, and that the import share of
country 3 has to be increased to ensure consistency of the trade matrix.11
Symmetric Preferences
Figure 1.1 shows the portfolio of country 1 as a function of the elasticity of
substitution, θ. Since all countries are symmetric the portfolio allocation is identical
in all three countries. In addition, due to the symmetric preference structure, asset
holdings of stocks 2 and 3 are identical. As mentioned, θ plays a key role for
11In case 1, bilateral and overall trade is balanced in steady state due to the symmetry across
countries. For better comparability, I assume bilaterally balanced trade in case 2 as well. This
assumption facilitates interpretation as bilateral net foreign asset position are balanced. However,
relaxing the assumption of bilateral balanced trade would not materially affect the results.
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Table 1.1: Trade Flow Matrix
Case 1: Sym. Pref. Case 2: Asym. Pref.
Import Country i 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0.7 0.15 0.15 0.7 0.1 0.2
Export Country j 2 0.15 0.7 0.15 0.1 0.7 0.2
3 0.15 0.15 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.6
Notes: The table reports the share αij that country i imports from export
country j in steady state for symmetric and asymmetric preferences regarding
the two foreign goods.
the composition of the portfolio. There exists a critical value of θ, θ˜s = 1.22, for
which dividends are unaffected by endowment shocks and the efficient consumption
allocation cannot be supported under the existing asset structure. For values of θ
smaller than this threshold, the portfolio of country 1 exhibits home bias, while for
values higher than θ˜s the portfolio mainly contains foreign shares. For values of θ near
the threshold point, the portfolio exhibits extreme home or foreign bias. The portfolio
responds very sensitively to parameter changes in this region (see Coeurdacier and
Gourinchas, 2009).
The composition of the portfolio depends on the way an asset can hedge consumption
risk relative to the other assets. This is determined by the relative value of a stock
compared to the other stocks and by the co-movement between the shock responses
of a stock’s dividend and consumption shares. These shock responses and thus the
hedging abilities of the individual assets change with θ.
As shown in the last section, consumption shares in country 1 fall in response to
a positive endowment shock to one of the foreign goods, if θ < 1/2 (since ρ = 2),
and rise otherwise. Similarly, the response of dividends depends on θ. Consider the
response of stock 2’s dividend to an increase of good 2 endowment. The ensuing
terms-of-trade decrease has a a negative effect on stock 2’s dividend (value effect),
while the endowment increase has a positive effect on stock 2’s dividend (volume
effect). For θ < θ˜s, the value effect dominates, since terms-of-trade fall more strongly
for lower θ. Thus, the dividend of stock 2 falls. However, for θ > θ˜s, the volume
effect dominates and the dividend of stock 2 increases.
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Figure 1.1: Equity Portfolio of Country 1 with Symmetric Preferences
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Notes: The figure shows the shares country 1 holds of stock 1 (S11 , solid line) and of stock 2 (S12 ,
dashed line) as a function of the elasticity of substitution θ. For symmetric preferences S12 = S13 .
The asset structure cannot replicate the efficient consumption allocation for θ = θ˜s = 1.22.
From these considerations, we can differentiate three different regions of θ for the
portfolio composition: For θ < 1/2, consumption shares and the dividend value of
stock 2 co-move positively, however the relative value of stock 1 is higher than of
stock 2 and the home stock prevails in the portfolio. If 1/2 < θ < θ˜s holds, the
relative hedging ability of stock 2 falls, since consumption shares and the dividend
value of stock 2 now co-move negatively, and the share of the home asset in the
portfolio rises.12 Once θ > θ˜s, the dividend of stock 2 rises after an endowment shock
in country 2 and holdings of stock 2 can hedge consumption risk (consumption shares
in country 1 are positively correlated with an endowment shock to good 2) relatively
better than holdings of stock 1. The portfolio now contains a higher proportion of
foreign shares than of home shares.
In summary, if consumption shares and the relative dividend value of the home asset
12For values of θ near θ˜s, country 1 goes short in assets of country 2 and 3. In this case, country 1
would want to hold a larger share of its own stock than it initially has in period 0 to ensure full
risk-sharing. This is financed by selling claims to the endowment of good 2 and 3. Country 2 and
3 behave in a similar way, such that all countries hold a leveraged position of their own stock,
i.e., more than 100%. After the endowment is distributed, each countries buys the respective
amounts of foreign good endowment from the other countries and subsequently hands it back to
them, thus, serving the claims it has shorted.
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co-move positively, the portfolio exhibits home bias, while a negative co-movement
leads to foreign bias. This confirms results from standard two-country models (see
Kollmann, 2006). Coeurdacier (2009) also finds a foreign bias for a high substitution
elasticity. In his model, the covariance between the home real exchange rate and home
equity returns matters for the composition of the portfolio. A positive covariance
leads to a home bias, while for a negative covariance the foreign share in the portfolio
prevails.
Asymmetric Preferences
Next, I assume the trade pattern outlined in table 1.1 for asymmetric preferences
(case 2). Figure 1.2 displays the portfolio of country 1 as a function of θ. In comparison
to the case with symmetric preferences, asset holdings of stock 2 and 3 differ and
asset holdings of stock 1 and 2 cannot support the efficient consumption allocation for
two values of θ. However, the composition of the portfolio still changes with θ. For
θ < θ˜a1 = 1.10, the portfolio contains mainly the local asset, while for θ > θ˜a2 = 1.28
foreign assets prevail. Between θ˜a1 and θ˜a2 portfolio holdings show strongly leveraged
positions and are hard to interpret.
Figure 1.2: Equity Portfolio of Country 1 with Asymmetric Preferences
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Notes: The figure shows the shares country 1 holds of stock 1 (S11 , solid line), of stock 2 (S12 , dashed
line) and of stock 3 (S13 , dotted line) as a function of the elasticity of substitution θ. The asset
structure cannot replicate the efficient consumption allocation for θ = θ˜a1 = 1.10 and θ = θ˜a2 = 1.28.
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In this setting, it is interesting to compare the two foreign shares, S12 and S13 .
When θ < θ˜a, asset holdings of stock 3 are higher than holdings of stock 2 except for
values of θ that are close to θ˜a, while for θ > θ˜a the opposite emerges. Trade flows
between country 1 and 3 are assumed to be higher than between country 1 and 2
(α13 = 0.2 > α12 = 0.1). Hence, these results show a (mostly) positive influence of
bilateral trade flows on asset holdings for θ < θ˜a, while for θ > θ˜a the influence is
negative. For the analysis in the next section, these results imply a value for θ that
is sufficiently small in order to generate the empirically identified positive effect of
bilateral trade on bilateral asset holdings (Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007; Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). The results also suggest that the influence of bilateral trade
flows is closely related to the portfolio composition regarding home and foreign assets.
1.3.3 How Bilateral Trade Flows Affect the Foreign
Portfolio Share
One major advantage of the three country model developed in this chapter is
that it enables me to analyze the effects of bilateral trade flows on asset holdings
independently of trade openness. Let us focus on country 1’s equity holdings of stock
2. An increase in the parameter α12 leads to a rise in trade flows between country 1
and 2. At the same time, the import share of country 1, α12 + α13, is assumed to stay
constant due to the presence of country 3. Of course, trade flows between country 1
and country 3 decrease, when α12 increases.
I fix the import share at 30% of output and assume that country 1 trades less
with country 2 than with the rest of the world, i.e., α12 ∈ (0, 0.15). Furthermore,
the substitution elasticity, θ, is set to 0.3 as the results in section 1.3.2 imply that a
relatively low value of θ is necessary to generate the empirically identified positive
effect of bilateral trade on bilateral equity holdings (see the evidence in section 1.4.2;
Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008).13
Figure 1.3 displays the share of stock 2 in country 1’s portfolio as a function of
α12 (solid line). It shows that bilateral trade flows have a positive effect on asset
holdings. Importantly, this effect is independent of the general openness to trade.
13Note that a value of, e.g., θ = 0.8 would also generate a positive effect of bilateral trade flows on
bilateral asset holdings. However, foreign asset holdings are mainly negative in this case.
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When country 1 and 2 trade more with each other, the ability of stock 2 to hedge
consumption risk increases and country 1 holds more of stock 2.
Consider for example the effects of a negative endowment shock to good 2. One
effect is the increase of stock 2’s dividend. In response to a negative endowment
shock terms-of-trades increase. In addition, the terms-of-trade increase dominates
the negative effect from the endowment decrease, since the value of θ is sufficiently
low. Another effect of the negative endowment shock is the increase of consumption
expenditures as both terms-of-trade and consumption shares increase. On the one
hand, the increase in the dividend of stock 2 is stronger for higher imports from
country 2 (α12 increases), since the rise in the terms-of-trade is stronger in this case.
This by itself would lead to lower asset holdings. On the other hand, consumption
expenditures react more strongly to the endowment shock if imports from country 2
are higher, thus calling for higher asset holdings of stock 2. Since the latter effect is
more pronounced, shares of stock 2 are higher for higher α12.
Figure 1.3: Country 1 Holdings of Stock 2 for Increasing Trade Flows
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Notes: The figure shows S12 for a bilateral import share α12 between 0 and 0.15. The total import
share is 0.3 (solid line) and 0.4 (dashed line), such that α13 = 0.3−α12 and α13 = 0.4−α12, respectively.
The elasticity of substitution is set to θ = 0.3.
Furthermore, I am interested in the effect of trade openness on asset shares
controlling for the effect of bilateral trade flows. To this end, I choose a higher import
share of 40% and repeat the experiment of computing the portfolio share of stock 2
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as a function of α12. Figure 1.3 plots the graphs for the two experiments. The solid
line depicts holdings of stock 2 for an import share of 30% and the dashed line shows
holdings of stock 2 for an import share of 40%. Comparing the asset holdings for
the two import shares shows that openness exerts an independent effect on bilateral
investment patterns. Although bilateral trade flows are the same, bilateral asset
holdings vary with the degree of trade openness. The influence of openness is positive
as country 1 holds a higher share of stock 2 for an import share of 40% than for
one of 30%. The explanation runs along similar lines as for the effect of α12 on S12 .
Consumption expenditures and the dividend of stock 2 fall more strongly in response
to a positive endowment shock to good 2, if trade openness is higher. The dividend
of stock 2 falls more strongly, since the relative price of good 2 in terms of good
1 falls more strongly due to consumption of good 1 being higher. If consumption
expenditures would be constant, this stronger response of stock 2 dividends would
mean that the agent would need to hold a lower share of stock 2 to generate the same
amount of financial income. However, consumption expenditures also react more
strongly to an endowment shock if trade openness is higher. This response calls for a
higher financial income and outweighs the dividend effect. Hence, S12 is higher for
higher trade openness.
Given this comparison between asset holdings for different import shares, I can
analyze possible interaction effects between bilateral trade flows and trade openness.
An interaction effect would show up through an influence of openness on the effect
bilateral trade has on stock holdings. For my calibration, I find a negative interaction
effect, where higher trade openness has a dampening effect on the influence of bilateral
trade flows on S12 . In other words, the slope of S12 is smaller for α12 + α13 = 0.4 in
comparison to α12 + α13 = 0.3. This negative interaction effect can be explained
through the stronger dividend response of stock 2 when trade openness is higher.
S12 increases with higher bilateral trade flows, since consumption expenditures react
more strongly to an endowment shock for increasing α12 and dominate the negative
effect of the dividend response. The dividend moves more strongly for increasing
α12, which would lead to lower asset holdings assumed consumption expenditures are
constant. This dividend increase for increasing α12 is stronger for a higher import
share. Thus, the positive effect of the consumption expenditure response on S12 is
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less pronounced for a higher import share, leading to the smaller slope of S12 for the
case of a 40% import share.
This negative interaction effect shows up for relatively small and relatively high
values of θ, whereas for intermediate values of θ, higher trade openness leads to a
stronger influence of bilateral trade on bilateral asset holdings. Thus, in those pa-
rameter regions, in which consumption shares and dividend values co-move positively
(see discussion in section 1.3.2), the interaction effect is negative. The interaction
effect for intermediate and high values of θ is driven by the dividend response along
the lines of the presented case for small values of θ.
1.4 Empirical Evidence
1.4.1 Data and Econometric Specification
In this section, I provide empirical evidence on the effects of bilateral and total
trade flows on the bilateral foreign asset position. For this analysis, I use a data-set
that breaks international security holdings down by the residence of the security
issuer, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) provided by the IMF.
The CPIS reports data on year-end cross-border security holdings, where security
holdings include holdings of equity and long- and short-term debt securities. The
empirical analysis is not confined to the narrow definition of equities as "claims on the
residual values of incorporated enterprises" (see CPIS Data: Notes and Definitions),
but also includes debt securities that offer an unconditional right to a fixed money
income. This ensures that the empirical measure of assets adequately matches the
broad definition of equities used in the theoretical model. There, equity shares
represent total claims to national output. Bond holdings can also have equity type
characteristics. For example, if the endowment realization is lower than the promised
fixed payment, the bond holder only receives the residual resource flow.14
Annual data starting in 2001 is available for up to 74 source and 236 destination
countries and territories. Although I could in principle employ panel data methods,
the low time-variation (high correlation over time) in bilateral asset holdings leads
14See also Heathcote and Perri (2009) who make a similar point.
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me to consider only cross-sections without losing too much sample information. To
estimate my model, I use the 2001 cross-section, which was also used by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2008),15 and the 2007 cross-section, which is the latest available year
and has the broadest country coverage.16
Specifically, my econometric analysis is based on the following gravity model:17
log(assetsij) = dj + β1 log(biltradeij) + βZij + γ1 log(tottradei) + γCi + ij , (1.26)
where assetsij is the level of portfolio investment in host country j by source country
i, biltradeij measures trade between source country i and host country j, tottradei is
total trade - that is, openness - of source country i, all three measured in millions of
US Dollars, dj is a host country dummy, and ij is an error term.18 I also include
a set of bilaterally varying control variables, Zij, and a set of controls for source
country characteristics, Ci. While Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) employ a double
fixed effects specification with host and source country dummies, I cannot use source
country dummies as they would absorb the effect of total trade.
I follow the literature and specify the dependent variable in natural logarithms.19
In addition, I exclude source and host countries that mainly act as financial offshore
centers.20 The reasons why these countries hold cross-border asset holdings might
differ systematically from other source countries since financial offshore centers are
mostly intermediaries (see the discussion in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). Similarly,
the motives why source countries hold assets of financial offshore centers might be
different as well.
15For a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the CPIS data regarding country coverage and
asset reporting, see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
16The data for 2008 is only preliminary.
17For a complete list of data sources and variable definitions, see appendix B.
18The empirical specification corresponds to the theoretical setup in the sense that the empirical
setup also focuses on the the bilateral relationship and the third country or rest of the world
only appears through the source country characteristics.
19While this forces me to exclude all observations that are equal to zero, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008) argue that this specification is justified on the grounds that the main focus is on variables
explaining the specific magnitude of investments. Including zero observations would put a higher
emphasis on regressors explaining the difference between zero and non-zero asset holdings. A
way to include zero observations would be to add a small "epsilon" to the dependent variable
before taking logs, i.e., log(assets+ ε).
20See appendix C for a list of excluded countries.
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1.4 Empirical Evidence
The set of bilaterally varying control variables, Zij, consists of variables that have
been previously found to influence bilateral investment patterns. First, these include
the geographical distance and the time-zone difference between two countries, which
could possibly have a negative impact on information flows and communication.21
Second, I include dummies for common language, past colonial relationship, and
currency unions, which are measures for cultural and financial proximity that could
help overcome information barriers. Furthermore, I include a dummy for the existence
of a tax treaty and control for a possible diversification motive by including the
correlation between GDP growth rates of source and host country.
The source country control variables, Ci, include country specific characteristics
that influence a source country’s propensity to hold outward investments. The
factors I control for are the size of the source country (measured by population) and
economic and financial development (measured by GDP per capita and stock market
capitalization). Richer countries and those with a more developed financial market
might have higher incentives to invest in securities of other countries (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). Besides these three factors, the bilateral portfolio composition
could also be affected by the source country’s financial openness. Therefore, I include
a measure for de jure financial openness, the Chinn-Ito index that measures capital
account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2008), and a measure for de facto financial openness,
the ratio of gross capital flows to GDP (see e.g. Kose et al., 2006).
1.4.2 Estimation Results
The first two columns of table 1.2 present OLS estimates for the 2001 cross-
section not including (column 1) and including (column 2) total trade as a regressor,
respectively. The results show that bilateral trade and total trade both have a
significant positive impact on bilateral asset holdings, even when controlling for
informational frictions and source country characteristics. Once I include total trade
in the regression, the influence of bilateral trade decreases slightly. The effect of total
trade is similar in magnitude to the effect of bilateral trade. Other significant factors
21While the negative impact of distance on trade in goods can be justified by transportation
costs, this does not apply to "weightless" equities. Distance is thus interpreted as a barrier to
information flows. The time difference between countries hinders communication directly (see
Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007; Portes and Rey, 2005; Stein and Daude, 2007).
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are bilateral distance (with the expected negative influence), common language, and
being in a currency union (both raising bilateral asset holdings). Economic and
financial development both seem to have a positive influence on a country’s bilateral
investment: GDP per capita and stock market capitalization both have significant
positive coefficients. A country’s population, apart from the role it plays in GDP
per capita, is not significant in itself. Including total trade in the regression leads
to marginally smaller coefficients for the regressors that control for source country
characteristics. Including measures for financial openness does not change the results
significantly (table 1.2, column 3). The coefficient for total trade is slightly smaller,
but still sizeable and significant. Both financial openness measures influence bilateral
asset holdings positively and significantly.
Using the cross-section for 2007 changes the OLS estimates only slightly, as columns
1 and 2 of table 1.3 show. However, some differences are noteworthy. First, there
are more observations. Interestingly, only a small share of the higher amount of
non-zero observations are due to the additional countries reporting to the CPIS in
2007.22 One potential explanation for the higher number of observations might be
an increasing worldwide financial integration. Second, the effects of some regressors
have become stronger, while others have become smaller. The coefficient for total
trade is slightly smaller than in 2001. The effect of the currency union is stronger in
2007, which might be driven by the European Monetary Union. The coefficient for
the time zone difference is now significant. However, it is positive and very small,
making an interpretation difficult. The coefficient of per capita GDP is higher, while
the one for stock market capitalization is smaller.
However, in the 2007 cross-section, the effect of total trade is not robust to including
measures for financial openness. The coefficient of total trade becomes insignificant
(table 1.3, column 3). Thus, the effect of total trade on bilateral asset holdings
might not be as robust as the effect of bilateral trade. Considering that the results
without financial openness show a smaller coefficient for total trade as well, a possible
conclusion might be that the effect of total trade has decreased with increasing
financial linkages.
22Countries that report their security holdings for the first time after 2001 include Pakistan (2002),
Barbados (2003), Kuwait (2003), Mexico (2003), Gibraltar (2004), India (2004), and Latvia
(2006). The number in parentheses is the first year these countries report their data in the CPIS.
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1.4 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical model shows an interaction effect between bilateral and total trade
flows, where total trade has a dampening effect on the influence of bilateral trade
on bilateral asset holdings. In column 4 of table 1.2 and table 1.3, respectively, I
include as an interaction term the product of the log of bilateral trade and the log
of total trade in the baseline regression.23 The coefficient of the interaction term is
significantly positive. Thus, both trade measures reinforce each other. Higher total
trade increases the influence bilateral trade has on asset holdings. The data does not
support the theoretically implied negative interaction effect.
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) point to an endogeneity problem that renders OLS
estimates biased and inconsistent. Not only does trade in goods affect asset holdings,
the reverse is also possible. Therefore, I use instrumental variables to check the
robustness of the results. The possibly endogenous regressors that I instrument are
bilateral and total trade, the correlation of GDP growth rates, GDP per capita, and
stock market capitalization. As instruments I use variables that are known to be
correlated with trade: the product of the land area of the two countries, a common
border dummy, a dummy for being in a free-trade-agreement, a dummy for the
number of landlocked countries in the country pair24, and a dummy for a common
colonial ruler after 1945.25 I also use the colonial dummy as an instrument (excluding
this dummy as an independent regressor). Furthermore, I include lagged GDP per
capita, lagged stock market capitalization, and the lagged correlation of GDP growth
rates in my list of instruments.
Column 5 of table 1.2 and column 5 of table 1.3 show the results for the IV
estimation. The results are mostly unchanged in comparison to the OLS estimates.
All regressors that were significant before are still significant with similarly sized
coefficients. One exception applies to the IV results for 2007. In line with the results
for the regression variant including financial openness measures, total trade does not
have an economically or statistically significant effect anymore.
23Including such an interaction term in the regression with the two financial openness measures
does not change the results.
24Takes values 0, 1 or 2.
25The dummy takes the value 1, if the two countries were colonies after 1945 and had the same
colonial ruler, e.g., Singapore and Sri Lanka.
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1.5 Conclusion
Using a three-country stochastic general equilibrium model, I have shown in this
chapter that bilateral trade and trade openness both have an independent and positive
effect on bilateral cross-country asset holdings. To my knowledge, this is the first
attempt to analyze these two effects in a unified framework as the separation of the
effects of bilateral trade and trade openness is impossible in a two-country model.
My model showed that bilateral trade flows can have a positive impact on the
bilateral foreign asset position. This means that two countries that trade more with
each other also hold higher shares of each other’s equities. The reason is that the
equities of the trade partners provide a better hedge for output risks. Similarly, higher
trade openness leads to higher bilateral asset holdings. Furthermore, I have identified
an interaction effect between the two trade measures. Higher trade openness dampens
the effect bilateral trade flows have on bilateral asset holdings.
My empirical findings mostly supported the theoretical results. Analyzing the
geographically categorized asset holdings of 74 countries showed that bilateral and
total trade both have a positive effect on bilateral portfolio holdings. Nevertheless,
the influence of total trade is less robust and seems to fall over time. While I found
empirical evidence for the positive effects of bilateral and total trade on asset holdings,
the negative interaction in the theoretical model is not supported by the data. In the
empirical exercise, the two trade measures reinforce each other.
It would be interesting to relax some of the simplifying assumptions in future work.
One example would be to analyze whether the results change in a framework with
incomplete markets.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A Derivation of Consumption and Terms-of-Trade
Responses to Endowment Shocks
In this appendix, I derive the responses of consumption shares and the terms-of-
trade to endowment shocks. The model is linearized around a symmetric equilibrium,
where endowments and prices are equal and trade is balanced. xˆ denotes percentage
deviations from the symmetric equilibrium x¯.
In a first step, I linearize the risk-sharing conditions, equations (1.15) and (1.16):
(1
θ
− ρ
)
Cˆ1 − 1
θ
cˆ1j =
(1
θ
− ρ
)
Cˆ2 − 1
θ
cˆ2j , (1.27)(1
θ
− ρ
)
Cˆ1 − 1
θ
cˆ1j =
(1
θ
− ρ
)
Cˆ3 − 1
θ
cˆ3j for j = 1, 2, 3. (1.28)
If 1
ρ
= θ, these equations become cˆ1j = cˆ2j and cˆ1j = cˆ3j .
Using the definition µij ≡ cij/Yj, the linearized risk sharing conditions, and the
resource constraints (equation (1.14)), I can show that endowment shocks affect
consumption shares µ11 and µ22 in the following way:
µˆ11 = Σ1Yˆ1 + Σ2Yˆ2 + Σ3Yˆ3, (1.29)
µˆ22 = Ψ1Yˆ1 + Ψ2Yˆ2 + Ψ3Yˆ3, (1.30)
where Σi and Ψi are functions of the structural parameters θ, ρ and αji . For all other
consumption shares, the following holds: µˆij = γijµˆ11 + χijµˆ22, where γij and χij are
combinations of µ¯ijs.26 The signs of Σi and Ψi are driven by the relationship between
ρ and θ. If θ = 1
ρ
, consumption shares remain constant, i.e., Σi = Ψi = 0. In this
case, full risk-sharing implies cˆ1j = cˆ2j and cˆ1j = cˆ3j , which means, that consumption
of good j has to change by the same amount in all countries. Thus, consumption
of good j increases proportionally to an increase of good j endowment in all three
26E.g.
γ12 =
µ¯32
µ¯31 (1− µ¯22) + µ¯21µ¯32
and χ12 =
µ¯21µ¯
3
2 − µ¯22µ¯31
µ¯31 (1− µ¯22) + µ¯21µ¯32
.
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countries, while consumption of the other two goods does not change.
If, 1
ρ
6= θ, the response of consumption shares depends on whether 1
ρ
or θ are
higher, which determines whether the goods are complements or substitutes (see
Kollmann, 2006). The three goods are complements, when higher consumption of one
good increases the marginal utilities of the other goods. For 1
ρ
> θ, the goods are
complements and consumption shares of a country increase for a positive endowment
shock in the same country, while they fall for a positive endowment shock in one
of the other countries. In contrast, for 1
ρ
< θ, the three goods are substitutes and
consumption shares in a country fall for a positive shock to the home good and
increase for a shock to the foreign good.
In a second step, I substitute the consumption share responses in the linearized
equations for relative prices, (1.21) and (1.22). The relative price responses can then
be summarized in the following way:
pˆ2 = Γ1p2Y1 + Γ2p2Y2 + Γ3p2Y3, (1.31)
pˆ3 = Γ1p3Y1 + Γ2p3Y2 + Γ3p3Y3, (1.32)
where
Γ1pj = −
1
θ
(
(γ12 − 1)Σ1 + χ12Ψ1 − 1
)
for j = 2, 3,
Γipi = −
1
θ
(
(γ12 − 1)Σi + χ12Ψi + 1
)
for i = 2, 3,
Γipj = −
1
θ
(
(γ12 − 1)Σi + χ12Ψi
)
for i 6= j, i = 2, 3, j = 2, 3.
Substituting the foregoing equations into the budget constraint, equation (1.20),
and using the assumption µ¯ij = αij (see Kollmann, 2006) results in:
Yˆ1
{
∆11 − (S11 − α11)− (S12 − α12)Γ1p2 − (S13 − α13)Γ1p3
}
+Yˆ2
{
∆21 − (S12 − α12)(Γ2p2 + 1)− (S13 − α13)Γ2p3
}
+Yˆ3
{
∆31 − (S12 − α12)Γ3p2 − (S13 − α13)(Γ3p3 + 1)
}
= 0 , (1.33)
32
B Data: Definitions and Sources
where ∆i1 = (α11 + α12γ12 + α13γ13)Σi + (α12χ12 + α13χ13)Ψi. I solve this equation for
S11 , S
1
2 , S
1
3 such that it holds for arbitrary realizations of Yˆ1, Yˆ2, Yˆ3, which yields
equations (1.23)-(1.25) in the main text.
B Data: Definitions and Sources
• Bilateral Portfolio Asset Holdings: Portfolio investment assets (equity
securities, long-term and short-term debt securities) held by source country
residents and issued by destination country residents. Asset holdings are end
of 2001 (2007) holdings measured in millions of current US dollars. Source:
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, International Monetary Fund, http:
//www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.
• Bilateral Trade: Sum of exports and imports between source and host country.
Annual data averaged over the period 1997-2001 and 1997-2007, respectively,
in millions of current US dollars. Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.
• Total Trade: Sum of exports and imports of the source country for a given
year. Annual data averaged over the period 1997-2001 and 1997-2007, respec-
tively, in millions of current US dollars. Source: Direction of Trade Statistics,
International Monetary Fund.
• Distance: Great-circle distance in miles between the approximate geographic
centers of source and host country taken from the CIA "World Factbook" (https:
//www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html).
Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004); Subramanian and Wei (2007).
• Common Language Dummy: Dummy variable, that is 1 if source and host
country have the same language. Constructed using country-specific information
from the CIA "World Factbook". Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004); Subramanian
and Wei (2007).
• Colony Dummy: Dummy variable, that is 1 if source and host country
have ever been in a colonial relationship. Constructed using country-specific
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information from the CIA "World Factbook". Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004);
Subramanian and Wei (2007).
• Time Difference: Absolute value of the time difference between source and
host country (ranging from 0 to 12). Source: http://timeanddate.com.
• Tax Treaty Dummy: Dummy variable, that is 1 if the source and host
country have a double taxation treaty prior to 1999. Source: Treaty data from
http://www.unctad.org.
• Population: Source country population in thousands. Source: World Develop-
ment Indicators, World Bank.
• GDP per capita: Source country GDP in current US dollars per capita.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
• GDP growth rate correlation: Correlation between the annual nominal
GDP growth rates of source country i and host country j using growth rates
from 1981-2000. For the IV-estimation I use the correlation between growth
rates for the period 1981-1990 as the lagged variable. Source: Calculations
based on World Development Indicators, World Bank.
• Stock Market Capitalization: Market capitalization of the companies, listed
on the source country’s stock exchange in millions of current US dollars. Source:
World Development Indicators, World Bank.
• Capital Account Openness (de jure financial openness): Chinn-Ito
index measuring the source country’s degree of capital account openness based on
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER). Source: Chinn and Ito (2008).
• Financial Openness (de facto): Source country’s gross capital flows (sum of
capital inflows and outflows) in percent of GDP. Source: International Financial
Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
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C List of Excluded Offshore Financial Centers
C List of Excluded Offshore Financial Centers
The following list contains the countries and territories I have excluded in my
empirical analysis. These countries and territories are classified as offshore financial
centers by the IMF (see Zorome, 2007). If a country or territory is an offshore financial
center according to the IMF, but was not excluded by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008),
I follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and do not exclude that country either.
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados,
Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus,
Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat,
Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Palau, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu.
D Tables
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Table 1.2: Regression Results for 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Log(assets) Log(assets) Log(assets) Log(assets) Log(assets)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Log bilateral trade 0.46 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.28
(8.95)*** (6.51)*** (7.13)*** (7.29)*** (1.69)*
Log total trade 0.42 0.27 0.50 0.75
(5.02)*** (2.86)*** (5.93)*** (4.04)***
Log distance -0.41 -0.45 -0.41 -0.38 -0.48
(-4.00)*** (-4.41)*** (-4.23)*** (-3.88)*** (-2.58)***
Common language dummy 0.76 0.84 0.78 0.81 0.94
(6.56)*** (7.32)*** (6.89)*** (7.09)*** (6.88)***
Colony dummy 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.25
(1.19) (1.49) (1.29) (1.30)
Currency union dummy 1.25 1.20 0.88 1.19 1.12
(8.44)*** (8.25)*** (6.33)*** (8.26)*** (7.22)***
Time zone difference 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(1.26) (0.71) (0.85) (0.40) (0.43)
Correlation in growth rates 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.12 0.30
(1.00) (1.01) (1.41) (0.83) (1.21)
Tax treaty dummy -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.11
(-0.19) (-0.77) (-0.59) (-0.15) (-1.24)
Log GDP per capita 1.35 1.14 0.86 1.02 0.88
(13.83)*** (10.82)*** (7.62)*** (9.49)*** (7.40)***
Log market capitalization 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.25
(4.82)*** (3.97)*** (3.49)*** (4.15)*** (3.36)***
Log Population 0.15 -0.00 0.17 -0.09 -0.19
(2.06)** (-0.05) (1.89)* (-1.17) (-2.09)**
De jure financial openness 0.43
(7.99)***
De facto financial openness 0.46
(6.21)***
Log bilateral trade*log total trade 0.10
(6.85)***
N 1725 1725 1645 1725 1725
Adjusted R¯2 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.77
Notes: Asset holdings are end of 2001 holdings measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Regressions
include fixed host country effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. De jure financial openness is measured
by capital account openness and de facto financial openness by gross capital flows in percent of
GDP.
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Table 1.3: Regression Results for 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Log(assets) Log(assets) Log(assets) Log(assets) Log(assets)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Log bilateral trade 0.49 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.69
(10.69)*** (8.27)*** (8.49)*** (9.64)*** (4.68)***
Log total trade 0.23 0.06 0.24 -0.03
(2.98)*** (0.70) (3.12)*** (-0.18)
Log distance -0.41 -0.44 -0.42 -0.41 -0.21
(-4.72)*** (-5.01)*** (-4.75)*** (-4.77)*** (-1.29)
Common language dummy 0.88 0.91 0.81 0.83 0.73
(8.08)*** (8.26)*** (7.38)*** (7.64)*** (5.34)***
Colony dummy -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.04
(-0.43) (-0.10) (0.02) (-0.20)
Currency union dummy 1.47 1.43 1.33 1.36 1.50
(10.46)*** (10.19)*** (9.63)*** (9.65)*** (9.68)***
Time zone difference 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
(3.12)*** (2.72)*** (2.83)*** (2.88)*** (2.99)***
Correlation in growth rates 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.48) (0.55) (0.31) (0.40) (0.23)
Tax treaty dummy 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.11 -0.00
(0.22) (0.10) (1.29) (1.31) (-0.01)
Log GDP per capita 1.50 1.37 1.33 1.16 1.34
(19.25)*** (15.85)*** (13.65)*** (12.96)*** (13.56)***
Log market capitalization 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.16
(3.47)*** (2.63)*** (2.30)** (4.64)*** (3.40)***
Log Population 0.15 0.07 0.33 -0.10 -0.02
(2.59)*** (1.10) (4.07)*** (-1.51) (-0.27)
De jure financial openness 0.24
(4.82)***
De facto financial openness 0.32
(6.57)***
Log bilateral trade*log total trade 0.12
(8.73)***
N 2417 2417 2388 2417 2417
Adjusted R¯2 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.74
Notes: Asset holdings are end of 2007 holdings measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Regressions
include fixed host country effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. De jure financial openness is measured
by capital account openness and de facto financial openness by gross capital flows in percent of
GDP.
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Chapter2
The International Transmission of the
Financial Crisis - A German Perspective
2.1 Introduction
The recent (2007-2009) financial crisis that started in a small segment of the U.S.
financial market spread rapidly around the world, infecting in particular the large
and globalized banking systems of advanced economies. It soon spilled over to the
real economy, leading to a massive collapse in global trade and a synchronized global
recession.1
In this chapter, we take two aspects of the crisis - the trade collapse and bank capital
losses, both representing a particular transmission channel - and study how they
shaped the crisis transmission to economically and financially integrated economies.
For this purpose, we use a quantitative international business cycle model featuring a
banking sector. The model economy is a small open economy integrated with the rest
of the world through trade in goods and through the banking sector trading foreign
assets. Global shocks are thus transmitted to the economy via a trade or a financial
channel. In the first case, following a trade shock, foreign demand for home goods
falters, leading to a decline in exports and output. In the second case, a financial
1According to the April 2009 World Economic Outlook, real GDP in advanced economies contracted
by an unprecedented 7.5% in the fourth quarter of 2008. Subsequently, real world trade declined
by 15% in the first quarter of 2009 (Bems et al., 2010).
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shock in form of losses on foreign assets destroys part of the banking sector’s capital.
The banks have to use their own funds for financing loans and foreign asset holdings
and consequently restrict lending, leading to declining investment and output.
Empirically, we focus the analysis on the example of Germany. As one of the
largest export nations in the world, the German economy was hit especially hard by
the trade collapse, while the globally operating part of the German banking system
also took its toll in the financial crisis, experiencing high capital losses. Using our
calibrated model, we are able to assess whether the trade or the financial channel
was more important in transmitting the global crisis to Germany.
To be clear, we do not model or analyze how the financial crisis lead to the collapse
of global trade or how it originated and infected banks’ balance sheets. Instead we
take the two shocks as given, analyze how the economy reacted to them, and assess
which of them led to a greater share in the output decline.
The model fitted to German data is able to generate the main experiences of the
German economy during the financial crisis. In particular, the calibrated model can
capture about 95% of the observed output decline. Regarding the two channels, it
turns out that the trade channel accounts for 70% of the explained GDP movement,
while the transmission via the financial channel is responsible for 30%. Although the
German banking system is of a globalized nature and held considerable amounts of
U.S. securities (described in more detail in the next section), Germany’s strong trade
linkages make it even more vulnerable to disruptions in foreign demand. However,
transmission via the trade channel leads to a relatively short recession. The financial
channel, in contrast, has longer-lasting effects and is therefore crucial in accounting
for the fact that German output in the last quarter of 2010 was still below the level
it had two years ago.
Our analysis is related to the literature studying the international transmission of
financial shocks via a global banking sector. Using a one-good two-country model,
Kollmann et al. (2011) show how a banking sector subject to a bank capital requirement
can transmit a loan default shock originating in one country. In comparison to their
paper, we study a two-good model. This allows a more detailed analysis of the trade
transmission channel, besides analyzing shock transmission via the banking sector.
Another difference is that we refrain from explicitly modeling the foreign economy
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and instead model a small open economy.
Other contributions with global banking sectors include Ueda (2010), who shows
how financial constraints and the net worth of creditors contribute to business cycle
synchronization, and Olivero (2010), who models an imperfectly competitive banking
sector, but does not consider financial shocks. Analyzing a model with financial
constraints, Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) show how financial contagion can spread
across countries through shocks to bank equity. However, they do not consider how
business cycles affect this transmission.
Eickmeier et al. (2011) study the transmission of U.S. financial shocks to a set
of advanced economies using a factor augmented VAR. They find that the recent
negative shock was large compared to previous financial shocks. While they are not
able to cleanly disentangle how the financial shock was transmitted via the different
channels, they can show that both trade and financial channel contributed to the
transmission.
Related to our research question, the recent literature assessing the cross-country
incidence of the 2007-2009 financial crisis also investigates the transmission via trade
and financial channels.2 These studies analyze whether the cross-country variation
in crisis incidence - measured by the severity and duration of output decline as
well as business cycle correlation - can be attributed to pre-crisis indicators. Our
approach differs from this empirical literature in two aspects. First, we focus on
the transmission to one particular country, while the studies of the aforementioned
literature analyze cross-country differences. Second, our transmission analysis is
model based, explicitly modeling the two transmission channels.
Several studies find that advanced economies were hit harder by the crisis (Claessens
et al., 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011; Rose and Spiegel, 2011) and that the
financial channel was relatively more important for the crisis transmission than the
trade channel. The results of Ólafsson and Pétursson (2010) show that the financial
channel - represented by relatively large banking sectors and strong global financial
linkages - together with the macro channel - represented by inflation, current account
deficits, and a leveraged private sector - plays an important role for the propagation
2Other transmission channels include e.g. a global increase in risk aversion and reliance on foreign
finance (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011) as well as a macro channel represented by macroeconomic
vulnerabilities and imbalances and an institutional channel (Ólafsson and Pétursson, 2010).
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of the crisis across countries, whereas there is little evidence for transmission via the
trade channel. Likewise, considering business-cycle correlations, the financial channel
was more important for the diffusion of the U.S. based crisis shock to OECD countries,
whereas non-OECD countries were mainly affected through the trade channel (Imbs,
2010).3 Claessens et al. (2010) find that fewer of the impact measures they use -
decline duration, severity and relative adversity - were affected by trade measures
and that countries were hit through the financial channel earlier than through the
trade channel. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) come to similar results, where real
variables like trade openness are correlated with output declines to a lesser extent
than financial factors.
On the other hand, Rose and Spiegel (2011) identify few consistent results linking
pre-crisis indicators and crisis intensity. Furthermore, considering the transmission
to financial variables like credit default swap premia, bank stock prices or equity
portfolios, there is little direct evidence that U.S. exposure or external exposure via
trade or financial openness led to higher contagion (Bekaert et al., 2011; Kamin and
DeMarco, 2010). Transmission via the financial channel, however, played a role for
the comovement of a country’s stock market returns with those of the U.S. (Didier
et al., 2010)
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents evidence
on how the German economy was affected by the recent financial crisis. Section 3
describes the model setup and its calibration. Section 4 discusses the results, while
section 5 concludes.
2.2 The German Economy during the 2007-2009
Financial Crisis
This section presents how the German economy was affected by the 2007-2009
financial crisis. In line with the two transmission channels presented in the intro-
duction, we focus on the behavior of trade and the developments in the financial
3For the crisis transmission to emerging markets, Blanchard et al. (2010) and Berkmen et al. (2009)
both find that the financial channel dominated the trade channel. In the former study, the
financial channel is represented by capital outflows, while in the latter the financial channel is
represented inter alia by bank lending linkages to advanced economies.
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Figure 2.1: Growth Rates of GDP, Exports, and Loans.
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Notes: The figure shows year-on-year (y-o-y) growth rates of GDP (solid line), exports (dashed
line), and loans to non-financial corporations (dotted line). The sample period for GDP and exports
is 1992Q1-2010Q4, while the data for loans starts 2000Q1. The shaded area indicates the latest
CEPR recession for the Euro Area.
sector. The main aspects are captured in figure 2.1, which shows year-on-year (y-o-y)
growth rates for GDP, exports, and loans to non-financial corporations for the period
1992Q1-2010Q4. The shaded area indicates the latest Euro Area recession (accord-
ing to CEPR). Figure 2.1 shows the unprecedented nature of the recent recession
considering the post reunification period.4 In 2009 German GDP fell annualized by
4.7%, with a growth rate of −6.9% in the first quarter of 2009 (compared to the
same quarter in 2008). By the end of 2010, it still had not returned to its pre-crisis
level. Exports experienced a similarly drastic downturn, falling by almost 20% in the
first two quarters of 2009. In a previous episode of negative export growth, during
the recession following the reunification boom, the decline was less than half of the
recent decline. The behavior of loan growth also shows a pronounced fall, although it
declines a few quarters later than GDP and export growth.
The massive decline of German exports goes hand in hand with the major slump
4Although not strictly comparable due to methodological differences, the growth decline was also
the largest considering the entire period after the second world war (see Statistisches Bundesamt,
2009).
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in global trade hitting the world by the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. The
global trade collapse was considerably larger than the accompanying world output
decline,5 which has sparked an ample search for the underlying reasons. The key
factor explaining the massive trade collapse is suspected to be a deterioration in
global demand, explaining 60% to 80% of the trade collapse (Behrens et al., 2010;
Cheung and Guichard, 2009; Mauro et al., 2010). In particular, using a trade-weighted
demand measure, the trade collapse does not seem so extraordinary as suggested by
traditional measures (Bussière et al., 2011).6 The German economy as one of the
leading export nations was particularly exposed to the collapse in world demand.
To capture how global demand has affected German exports, we construct a
measure for “global demand” including industrial production of the largest German
trading partners (see appendix A for details). The left panel of figure 2.2 shows a
close relationship of “global demand” and German export growth, with the trough
of demand preceding the trough of exports by about one quarter. A striking detail
of the latest collapse is the massive dimension of both demand and export decline.
Both series fell by about 20%.
The right panel of figure 2.2 shows net exports scaled by GDP. Net exports have
been positive since the beginning of 2000 and grew continuously. However, during
the crisis they declined strongly from about 8% of GDP to less than 3% of GDP.
Next, we turn to the developments in the banking sector. The German banking
sector was hit hard by the financial crisis. Laeven and Valencia (2010) identify a
systemic banking crisis in Germany, starting in 2008. They base their identification
on various banking policy intervention measures of which at least three had to take
place to define a banking crisis. For Germany the following interventions occurred:
extensive liquidity support, significant guarantees on liabilities and a significant bank
nationalization (Hypo Real Estate in 2008). The estimations of Laeven and Valencia
(2010) show that total assets of failed and government assisted banks in Germany
5Real world GDP fell by 7.9 % (annualized) in the first quarter of 2009, while real world trade
contracted by 15% in the same period (Bems et al., 2010).
6Other factors contributing to the trade deterioration include tighter conditions for trade finance
(Ahn, 2010; Amiti and Weinstein, 2009; Chor and Manova, 2010; Coulibaly et al., 2011), increased
vertical supply integration (Behrens et al., 2010; Levchenko et al., 2010), the concentration of
the demand decline on export intensive goods and durables (Bems et al., 2010; Eaton et al.,
2011), or inventory adjustment (Alessandria et al., 2010).
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Figure 2.2: German Exports, Global Demand, and Net Exports.
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Notes: The left panel compares y-o-y growth of German exports (solid line) and of a measure for
global demand (dashed line). Global demand is represented by a weighted average of industrial
production of the 20 largest German trading partners. The right panel displays net exports as a
ratio to GDP.
amounted to 7% and 29% of total banking assets, respectively. In comparison, U.S.
banks that failed or received government assistance accounted for 24% of total banking
assets, while, e.g., in France a total of 78% of assets in the banking system belonged
to banks that either failed or received government assistance.
The banking sector faced massive writedowns on its loans and securities holdings,
draining the capital position and leading inter alia to failure or the need for some
kind of assistance. The IMF (2010) estimates that German banks faced cumulative
writedowns on their total loans and securities portfolio of 314 billion U.S. dollars
during the financial crisis. For the securities holdings alone this amounts to an implied
cumulative loss rate of 11.2%.
These substantial losses led to strains on banks’ balance sheets, forcing them to
deleverage their capital position. One way to accomplish this was to restrict lending,
thereby transmitting the financial shock to the real economy. Figure 2.1 shows that
the loan volume to non-financial corporations declined. However, the decreasing loan
volume could either be an expression of bank-sided factors that led banks to restrict
their loan supply or it could stem from the demand side, with firms demanding lesser
loans during times of faltering GDP growth. We will explore the role played by
bank-sided factors in the reduction of the loan volume next.
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Although the German central bank did not find signs for a broad credit crunch
(Bundesbank, 2009, 2010), there is some evidence for negative loan supply shocks
and bank-sided factors having had a dampening effect on loan growth. Busch et al.
(2010) analyze the dynamics of loans to non-financial corporations in Germany using
a Bayesian VAR with sign restrictions and find high negative loan-supply shocks at
the end of 2008 and in the beginning of 2009. Specifically, the loan-supply shocks had
a lagged effect on loan volumes, which might be a possible explanation for the lagged
decline of loan growth in figure 2.1.7 Similarly, Hristov et al. (2011) find that for
Euro Area members including Germany, loan-volume changes and part of the decline
in GDP growth resulted from adverse loan-supply shocks. In particular, in Germany
the adverse effects developed during 2009 and the beginning of 2010.8 Looking at
consumer loans, Puri et al. (2011) show that banks with a high exposure to U.S. toxic
assets restricted loans more strongly than banks without this exposure. In line with
this are the results by Rottmann and Wollmershäuser (2010) demonstrating that
large firms, who mostly rely on those banks hit hardest by the crisis (state-owned
“Landesbanken” and commercial banks), faced a heightening unwillingness of banks
to grant credit.
Figure 2.3 displays how credit standards (left panel) and the spread between loan
and deposit rates (right panel) have reacted during the financial crisis. A high
proportion of German banks considerably tightened credit standards starting in the
second half of 2008, after a four-year long period of easing credit standards. At the
same time the spread between loan and deposit rates widened strongly, increasing
from an all-time low in early 2008 by approximately 2 percentage points (figure 2.3,
right panel, solid line, left axis). To depict the negative relation between loan-rate
spread and loan growth, the right panel of figure 2.3 also includes loan growth (dashed
line, right axis). During times of high loan-rate spreads, loan growth was very small
or negative and vice versa. Notably, in the beginning of the crisis period the spread
was very low, while loans to non-financial corporations boomed, although they did
not reach the high growth rates of the early 2000s.
The German banking sector operates on a global scale with claims on non-residents
7Explanations involve e.g. slow re-negotiations of credit lines.
8Similar results for bank-side factors affecting loan supply comes from Aiyar (2011), who finds
that banks in the UK substantially decreased domestic lending after a shock to foreign funding.
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Figure 2.3: Change of Credit Standards, Loan Deposit Rate Spread and Loan Growth.
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Notes: The left panel presents the results of the bank lending survey regarding overall credit
standards. Banks were asked how their credit standards have changed over the last three months.
The graph shows the difference between the weighted sums of answers to “credit standards were
tightened” and answers to “credit standards were eased” (each in percent of total answers given). A
positive value means that a higher proportion of banks has tightened credit standards. The right
panel contrasts the spread between the loan and deposit rates measured in percentage points (solid
line, left axis) with y-o-y growth of loans to non-financial corporations (dashed line, right axis).
amounting to over 100% of GDP, making it vulnerable to adverse financial devel-
opments in the rest of the world. In particular, Germany was the seventh largest
holder of U.S. long-term corporate asset-backed securities, holding a total amount
of 42 billion U.S. dollars right before the crisis in June 2007 (Department of the
Treasury, 2008). Of these, 80% constituted of mortgage-backed securities. Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2011 observe that several industrial countries with heavily affected
financial institutions held large amounts of asset-backed securities. Figure 2.4 shows
the development of foreign claims on non-residents by German banks from 2003 to
2010. Foreign claims on all countries increased until an all-time high of 134% of GDP
in the third quarter of 2007 and have since been mostly declining (figure 2.4, left
panel). A similar picture emerges considering y-o-y growth of one segment of foreign
claims, namely securities from the U.S. (figure 2.4, right panel). These assets fell
substantially during the crisis years.
In this section, we have analyzed the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on
the German economy, with a special focus on the effects on exports and the banking
sector. As a next step, we integrate the export developments and bank losses into a
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Figure 2.4: Foreign Claims by German Banks.
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Notes: The left panel shows claims on non-residents (all countries) as a ratio to GDP. The right
panel shows claims on non-residents (U.S. securities), y-o-y growth.
small open economy model that is connected to the rest of the world via trade in
goods and securities. This enables us to study the transmission of the financial crisis
via trade and financial channel. In particular, we can assess the relative importance
of the two transmission channels.
2.3 The Model
We use a small open economy variant of the model proposed in Kollmann et al.
(2011). The economy is inhabited by a representative worker, an entrepreneur, and a
bank. There are two goods, a home intermediate good produced by the entrepreneur
and a foreign intermediate good produced in the rest of world. Both intermediate
goods are combined into a final good that is used for consumption by the three agents
and for investment by the entrepreneur. The bank intermediates funds between the
worker, the entrepreneur and the rest of the world by collecting deposits from the
worker, making loans to the entrepreneur and trading foreign assets with the rest of
the world. Hence, the economy is connected to the rest of the world through two
channels, trade in intermediate goods (the trade channel) and trade in foreign assets
(the financial channel). These two channels, and in particular the underlying trade
and financial shock, will be the focus of the crisis transmission assessment.
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2.3.1 The Worker
The worker’s utility depends on consumption of the final good Ct, bank deposits
Dt+1 and hours worked Nt:
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
(Ct+s − ψwCt+s−1)1−σw − 1
1− σw + Ψ
D (Dt+1+s)
1−σw − 1
1− σw −Ψ
NNt+s
]
,
(2.1)
where β is the subjective discount factor, σw > 0 governs the worker’s intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and ΨD, ΨN > 0 are preference parameters. The worker
has habits in consumption with ψw measuring the degree of internal habit persistence.
In addition to paying interest, deposits provide liquidity services to the worker. This
is one way to model a positive spread between loan and deposit rates and to ensure
that workers hold deposits, whereas entrepreneurs borrow from the bank.9
The budget constraint of the representative worker in terms of the final good, which
is used as the numéraire, is
Ct + patDt+1 = patWtNt + patDtRDt−1. (2.2)
The household earns income from supplying labor to the entrepreneur and from
interest payments on deposits held with the bank. The wage rate Wt is measured in
terms of the home intermediate good. Thus, labor income in terms of the final good is
patWtNt, where pat is the relative price of the home intermediate good in terms of the
final good. RDt−1 is the gross interest rate on deposits made last period, Dt, measured
in terms of the home intermediate good as well. The worker either consumes his
income or saves in new deposits Dt+1.
Maximizing the worker’s utility subject to his budget constraint yields the following
9Another way to model such a setup would be to assume that the worker has a smaller subjective
discount factor than entrepreneur and banker, i.e. that the worker is more patient than the other
two agents (see Kollmann et al., 2011; Van den Heuvel, 2008).
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first-order conditions:
(Ct − ψwCt−1)−σw − ψwβ (Ct+1 − ψwCt)−σw = λw,t, (2.3)
ΨD
(
D−σwt+1
λw,t
)
+ βEt
[
pat+1R
D
t
(
λw,t+1
λw,t
)]
= pat , (2.4)
λw,tp
a
tWt = ΨN , (2.5)
where λw,t is the multiplier on the budget constraint. Equation (2.3) shows how
consumption habits affect the optimizing behavior of the worker. The Euler equation
(2.4) differs from a standard Euler equation through the additional term representing
the liquidity services provided by deposits. The third first-order condition shows the
trade-off between consumption and labor.
2.3.2 The Entrepreneur and Final Good Production
The entrepreneur produces the home intermediate good at by combining capital
and labor provided by the worker via a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = zt(Kt)α(Nt)1−α, (2.6)
where α is the capital share and zt is total factor productivity following an AR(1)
process:
log(zt) = ρz log(zt−1) + εz,t. (2.7)
The capital stock, owned by the entrepreneur, depreciates with rate δ and increases
through gross investment It:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It. (2.8)
The entrepreneur uses the final good for investment. However, the final good cannot
be transformed costlessly into capital. Instead, to produce investment It the amount
of final goods needed is
ξ(It) = It + 0.5Ξ
(
It
I¯
− 1
)2
, Ξ > 0. (2.9)
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To finance his operations, the entrepreneur borrows one-period loans Lt from the
bank, on which he has to pay the gross loan rate RLt−1. Thus, the entrepreneur’s
budget constraint is
patLtR
L
t−1 + ξ(It) + patWtNt + dEt = patLt+1 + patYt, (2.10)
where dEt is the entrepreneur’s dividend income. The entrepreneur derives utility
from consuming his dividend income according to the following utility function:
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs

(
dEt+s − ψEdEt+s−1
)1−σE − 1
1− σE
 . (2.11)
The entrepreneur’s risk aversion differs from the worker’s risk aversion. Below we will
fix σE to be lower than σw, making the entrepreneur less risk averse than the worker.
However, as mentioned earlier, the subjective discount factor β is the same for all
agents. Like the worker, the entrepreneur has habits in consumption, governed by ψE.
The first-order conditions corresponding to the maximization of the entrepreneur’s
utility (2.11), taking into account the constraints (2.8) and (2.10), are:
(
dEt − ψEdEt−1
)−σE − ψEβ (dEt+1 − ψEdEt )−σE = λE,t, (2.12)
βEt
[
pat+1
pat
(
λE,t+1
λE,t
)
RLt
]
= 1, (2.13)
βEt
(λE,t+1
λE,t
)pat+1αzt+1
(
Kt+1
Nt+1
)α−1
+ ξ′(It+1) (1− δ)
 = ξ′(It), (2.14)
(1− α)zt
(
Kt
Nt
)α
= Wt. (2.15)
The final good Ft used for consumption and investment is bundled from home and
foreign intermediate goods, at and bt, via the CES-aggregator
Ft =
(
ω
1
θ (at)
θ−1
θ + (1− ω) 1θ (bt) θ−1θ
) θ
θ−1
, (2.16)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1
is the share of the home intermediate good used for the final good in case of equal
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prices. ω > 0.5 corresponds to a home bias in consumption and investment. A
cost-minimization argument yields the demand functions for at and bt:
at = ω (pat )
−θ Ft, (2.17)
bt = (1− ω)
(
pbt
)−θ
Ft, (2.18)
with pbt denoting the relative price of foreign intermediate goods in terms of the final
good.
2.3.3 The Bank
The bank collects deposits from the worker, makes loans to the entrepreneur, and
trades foreign assets with the rest of the world. Foreign assets At+1 are denominated
in foreign currency.10 The home currency value of foreign assets is therefore ptAt+1,
where pt = pbt/pat are the terms-of-trade defined as the ratio of import to export
prices.
As in Kollmann et al. (2011), the bank faces a capital requirement. This means
that the bank’s capital in period t, Lt+1 + ptAt+1 − Dt+1, should not fall below a
fraction γ of the bank’s assets, Lt+1 + ptAt+1. When the bank does not meet the
capital requirement and capital falls short of the required fraction γ, the bank incurs
costs.11 These costs depend on the amount of capital exceeding/falling short of the
requirement, i.e. the excess capital xt, defined as xt = (1− γ)(Lt+1 + ptAt+1)−Dt+1.
The cost function φ(xt) has the form
φ(xt) = φ1xt +
φ2
2 (xt)
2. (2.19)
If capital falls short of the requirement and excess capital is negative, costs are
positive, whereas holding more capital then required leads to a reduction in operation
costs, discussed next.
10Actually, more than half of the claims by German banks on non-residents are denominated in
Euro. However, here we focus on a financial shock originating in the U.S. financial market and
on average around 90% of German banks’ claims on the U.S. are denominated in U.S. dollar.
11We assume that in this case the bank needs funds for its efforts to meet the capital requirement,
while a high capital buffer eases operations.
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All bank operations - collecting deposits from workers, handing out loans to
entrepreneurs, and holding foreign assets - lead to linear operation costs ΓD,ΓL, and
ΓA. The bank’s budget constraint is:
pat
(
Lt+1 +DtRDt−1 + ΓDDt+1 + ΓLLt+1 + ΓA(At+1) + φ(xt) +
χA
2
(
At+1 − A¯
)2)
+ pbtAt+1 + dBt = pat
(
LtR
L
t−1 +Dt+1
)
+ pbtAtRAt Qt. (2.20)
Here, dBt is the banker’s dividend income. To induce stationarity we assume that
the foreign assets are subject to quadratic portfolio adjustment costs (see Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 2003). Specifically, deviations of foreign asset holdings from their
steady-state value A¯ are costly.
The foreign asset pays a risky return, where RAt+1 is the expected gross return
of foreign assets accumulated in period t. The return is exogenous and follows an
AR(1)-process:
log(RAt ) = (1− ρR) log(R¯A) + ρR log(RAt−1) + εR,t. (2.21)
In addition, foreign assets are subject to an unpredictable i.i.d. valuation shock
Qt. With this structure we split the return of the foreign asset into returns under
normal circumstances and into a valuation shock that represents more fundamental
re-evaluations, such as those massive writeoffs experienced during the current financial
crisis. Subsequently, the valuation shock will represent the foreign financial shock,
when we assess the crisis transmission.
The banker consumes his dividend income and maximizes his utility function
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs

(
dBt+s
)1−σB − 1
1− σB
 (2.22)
subject to the budget constraint (2.20). The corresponding first-order conditions are:
βEt
pat+1
pat
(
dBt+1
dBt
)−σB
RDt
 = 1− ΓD + φ′(xt). (2.23)
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βEt
pat+1
pat
(
dBt+1
dBt
)−σB
RLt
 = 1 + ΓL + φ′(xt)(1− γ), (2.24)
βEt
pbt+1
pbt
(
dBt+1
dBt
)−σB
RAt+1Qt+1
 = 1 + ΓA
pt
+ φ′(xt)(1− γ) + χA
pt
(
At+1 − A¯
)
,
(2.25)
2.3.4 Market Clearing and Definitions
We assume that the costs incurred by the bank are paid in terms of the home
intermediate good. The bank has to buy these resources from the entrepreneur. Thus,
market clearing for the home intermediate good requires
Yt = at + a∗t + φ(xt) + ΓDDt+1 + ΓLLt+1 + ΓAAt+1 +
χA
2
(
At+1 − A¯
)2
, (2.26)
where a∗t is the amount of the home intermediate good exported to the rest of the
world. The demand from the rest of the world for home intermediate goods is specified
as (see e.g. Justiniano and Preston, 2010):
a∗t = (1− ω) (p∗at )−θ Y ∗t . (2.27)
The foreign demand depends on the relative price for the home intermediate good
in the rest of the world p∗at , which is inversely related to the terms-of-trade, and on
foreign demand Y ∗t , which follows an AR(1) process
log(Y ∗t ) = ρY log(Y ∗t−1) + εY,t. (2.28)
Net exports scaled by GDP are
nxt =
a∗t − ptbt
Yt
. (2.29)
Finally, market clearing for the final good requires that the production of final goods
equals the sum of aggregate consumption, which is the sum of worker, entrepreneur
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and banker consumption, and the amount used for investment:
Ft = Ct + dEt + dBt + ξ(It). (2.30)
2.3.5 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match properties of the German economy. A period
in the model corresponds to one quarter. We set the parameter ω such that trade
openness in the model, 1−ω, matches the average trade openness of Germany during
the sample period, which runs from the first quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of
2010. The substitution elasticity between home and foreign goods θ is fixed at 1.5, a
standard value in the literature (see Backus et al., 1994).
The capital share in production α is set to 0.3, which corresponds to the average
capital share in Germany over the sample period. Physical capital depreciates with a
rate of δ = 0.025 per quarter. We use the investment adjustment cost parameter Ξ to
match the relative volatility of investment of the model, i.e. the standard deviation of
investment relative to the standard deviation of GDP, with the empirical counterpart
of 2.55 (see table 2.1). To calculate the relative investment volatility of the model,
we simulate the model including the three shock processes as described below.
The approximate capital ratio of German banks, i.e. the ratio of bank equity to
total bank assets (not risk-weighted) over the period 1998-2010 was 5%. Thus, we
set the required bank capital ratio to this value, γ = 0.05. The steady state deposit
and loan rates are set to their respective averages over the period 1997-2010, 2.69%
p.a. and 5.60% p.a. Thus, the spread is 2.91% in steady state. We assume that
the bank incurs equal costs for handling domestic deposits, loans or foreign assets,
ΓD = ΓL = ΓA=0.0035. Assuming equal operating costs, the bank’s first order
conditions for loans and foreign assets, (2.24) and (2.25), imply that in steady state
the interest rate on foreign assets RA has to be equal to the loan rate.12 Similar to
Davis (2010), the parameter governing portfolio adjustment costs is set to a small
value, χA = 0.005.
12The foreign asset return series used to match the process for foreign asset returns gives an average
quarterly return of 1.37% over the sample period. This is roughly the same as the quarterly loan
rate of 1.4%.
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The loan rate also determines the subjective discount factor β = 0.9862, which
follows from the Euler equation of the entrepreneur (equation (2.13)). We follow
Kollmann et al. (2011) and assume log utility for the worker and the banker, σw =
σB = 1, and almost risk-neutral entrepreneurs, i.e. σE = 0.01. As in Gerali et al.
(2010), entrepreneurs and workers have the same consumption habits of ψE = ψw =
0.85.
Excess capital in steady state is zero. We also need to fix the parameters of the
excess capital cost function, φ1 and φ2. Given the bank’s costs for handling deposits,
loans, and foreign assets, any of the bank’s Euler equations in steady state yields φ1.
For the curvature of the excess cost function, we follow Kollmann et al. (2011) and
set φ2 = 0.25/Y .
The loans to physical capital ratio is set such that the ratio of loans to annual
GDP in steady state matches the mean of the empirical counterpart for Germany
during the sample period, which is 86%. Together with the assumption about excess
capital in steady state being zero, this pins down the preference parameters of the
worker, ΨD = 0.05 and ΨN = 2.35. Our calibration entails that the worker has the
highest consumption share, 72.84% of GDP, while the entrepreneur’s and banker’s
consumption shares are considerably lower, 5.98% and 0.35% of GDP, respectively.
We also fix the ratio of loans to foreign assets in steady state. Empirically, the
ratio of foreign securities to domestic loans is approximately 30%. Setting A/L = 0.3,
the model’s net foreign asset position (NFA) to GDP is 25.64%, which corresponds
to the empirical NFA/GDP ratio of Germany for 2007.13
The foreign demand process is approximated using a series constructed with
industrial production of Germany’s 20 biggest trading partners (see figure 2.2). A
detailed description of the data is provided in appendix A. The global demand
series has an autocorrelation of 0.9 and a standard deviation of 4.78%. Thus, we
set ρY = 0.9 and E (εY,t)2 = (0.0208)2. The AR(1) process for TFP is matched to
linearly detrended German log TFP. Based on this measure, we set ρz = 0.9 and
E (εz,t)2 = (0.0076)2; the unconditional standard deviation of German TFP is 1.74%.
For the return of the foreign assets we combine data on stock and corporate debt
returns. This series has an autocorrelation of 0.15 and a standard deviation of 4.60%.
13Here we have used the NFA position from the updated and extended version of the External
Wealth of Nations Mark II database constructed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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We also match the empirical correlations between the three data series. The
correlation between TFP and foreign demand is 0.82, Corr (εz,t, εY ∗,t) = 0.82. In
contrast, the correlations between the returns to foreign assets and home TFP as
well as foreign demand are not significantly different from zero.
2.4 Results
The model is solved using a first-order approximation. First, we use the model to
examine whether it is able to capture features of German business cycles by comparing
empirical moments of the data with theoretical moments of the model. In a second
step, we compute impulse response functions to analyze the transmission of trade
and financial shocks in our model and study whether the model is able to generate
the experiences of the German economy during the financial crisis as described in
section 2.2.
2.4.1 Business Cycle Statistics
As a first step, we compare the business cycle properties of our model with those of
the data. For this purpose, we calculate second moments of HP-filtered German data
for the period 1991Q1-2010Q4 and HP-filtered theoretical moments of the model. In
this exercise, we include three of the four shocks of our model: TFP, trade and foreign
asset returns. The valuation shock does not play a role under normal circumstances.
Hence, we only include the shock process for “normal” foreign asset returns. The
three shocks are set to the fitted AR(1) processes described in the previous section.
Table 2.1 presents the moments of the data (column 1), of the model with all shocks
(column 2), as well as of the model including TFP, trade and foreign asset return
shocks separately (columns 3-5). The model is able capture most features of German
business cycles, in particular considering that we only targeted the relative volatility
of investment, when calibrating the model. GDP volatility generated by the model
including all shocks is somewhat higher than its counterpart in the data, 1.76% vs.
1.37%. However, the relative volatilities of the other variables and their correlations
with GDP are matched quite closely. As in the data, aggregate consumption is
less volatile than GDP. Loans show a higher relative volatility than deposits in the
57
Chapter 2
Table 2.1: Business Cycle Statistics of German Data and the Model
Data Model
All TFP Trade Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standard deviation (in %)
GDP 1.37 1.76 1.44 0.18 0.80
Relative standard deviations
Consumption 0.60 0.74 0.59 0.74 1.24
Investment 2.55 2.55 2.39 0.99 3.45
Employment 0.47 0.81 0.46 1.46 1.43
Deposits 0.99 0.56 0.26 1.68 0.95
Loans 1.25 0.69 0.39 0.71 1.37
Loan deposit rate spread 0.27 0.21 0.03 0.28 0.45
Net Exports 0.66 0.50 0.11 2.94 0.81
Correlation with GDP
Consumption 0.43 0.62 0.77 -0.67 0.69
Investment 0.86 0.85 0.94 0.33 0.64
Employment 0.54 0.89 0.98 1.00 1.00
Deposits -0.14 0.16 0.26 -0.11 0.01
Loans 0.27 -0.13 0.04 -0.09 -0.21
Loan deposit rate spread -0.59 -0.44 -0.99 0.81 -0.98
Net Exports 0.59 0.37 0.13 0.96 -0.26
Notes: This table compares empirical and theoretical moments. Empirical statistics are computed
using German data running from 1991Q1 to 2010Q4, except for data on loan deposit rate spreads
that starts 1997Q1. For data sources see appendix A. Theoretical statistics are generated by the
model variants including all three shocks together and the three shocks separately. All variables are
HP-filtered and except for the loan deposit rate spread logged before applying the HP-filter.
model, but are even more volatile in the data. The model predicts a relative standard
deviation of the loan deposit rate spread that is very close to the data. Similarly, the
relative volatility of net exports is captured quite well.
As in the data, investment is more procyclical than consumption. While the model
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is able to generate the negative correlation between the interest rate spread and GDP
as well as the procyclicality of net exports, it is not able to fully account for the
correlations of deposits and loans with GDP.
Considering the three shocks separately shows that the model including only the
TFP shock predicts a GDP volatility that is close to the actual GDP volatility.
In addition, the relative standard deviations of consumption and employment are
matched almost exactly. However, the relative volatilities of the financial variables
and net exports are strongly underpredicted. This shows the importance of including
the trade and financial shocks to account for German business cycle moments.
The trade shock contributes relatively little to output fluctuations. However, it
is the only shock predicting a countercyclical correlation of deposits as in the data.
On the other hand, the trade shock by itself generates a counterfactual negative
correlation of consumption and a counterfactual positive correlation of the interest
rate spread with output.
Finally, including only the shock to foreign asset returns leads to a very close
match of the relative standard deviation of loans and deposits in the model to their
respective counterparts in the data. In this case, loans are more volatile than output
and deposits are almost as volatile as output. However, the relative volatilities of all
other variables are overpredicted by this model variant.
Having shown that the proposed model captures the properties of German business
cycles statistics quite well, we can now continue to analyze how the latest financial
crisis was transmitted to the German economy.
2.4.2 Crisis Transmission
In this section, we analyze the crisis transmission to the German economy, focusing
on two particular shocks representing the transmission via the trade and the financial
channel. The foreign demand shock, subsequently called trade shock, represents
developments in global trade, while the valuation shock, or financial shock, represents
the massive value loss of foreign asset holdings. The magnitudes of the shocks are
chosen to match the observed declines in trade and asset values. The financial shock
is set to 11%, matching the estimated losses on securities incurred by German banks
(see section 2.2). Hence, foreign assets are hit by a one time valuation shock Qt of
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses to Simultaneous Trade and Financial Shocks.
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−11%. The trade shock is set to −20%, based on the global demand measure that fell
by approximately 20% in the beginning of 2009 (see figure 2.2). The autocorrelation of
the trade shock is set to 0.8, which is different compared to the previous section. With
this we intend to capture the extraordinary duration of the compressed demand.14
In a first step, we study whether our model economy is able to capture characteristics
of the German economy during the financial crisis when hit simultaneously by both
trade and financial shocks. Next, we turn to a comparison of the effects of the two
14After the 20% decrease of the global demand measure, it recovers fairly quickly, corresponding to
an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.8 in the periods after the trough.
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shocks, assessing their relative importance in the crisis transmission.
Figure 2.5 presents the impulse responses to a simultaneous negative trade and
financial shock. On impact, GDP falls by 3.31%, with continuing negative growth
for about 14 quarters. Investment and hours fall on impact by 2.5% and 4.7%,
respectively. Aggregate consumption declines in a hump-shaped manner, with an
impact response of −0.47% and a maximum response of −2.22% after 10 quarters.
The financial shock destroys part of the bank’s balance sheet. Bank capital declines
by 27.7% and recovers very slowly. This leads to an increase of the loan-deposit
interest rate spread by 0.34 percentage points on impact. Since it is costly to deviate
from the capital requirement, the bank adjusts its balance sheet. The value of foreign
assets in home currency falls by 10.26% on impact and declines by another 10%
during the next 2 years. Subsequently, loans and deposits decrease as well. Whereas
deposits fall by 0.84% on impact, loans stay constant for the first two quarters before
declining. Thus, the lagged loan decrease in the model is roughly consistent with the
observed behavior of loan volume growth (see figure 2.1). The negative trade shock
leads to decreasing foreign demand and exports decline by 12.63%. They fall more
strongly than imports, leading to a decrease of net exports.
Thus, by including both shocks, we can capture many features characterizing the
German economy during the financial crisis. In particular, the model responses show
a decline in macroeconomic activity, with output, consumption, investment, and hours
decreasing on impact. The model is particularly successful in explaining the decline
of German GDP. Output fell by 3.5% in the first quarter of 2009, compared to 3.31%
in the model.15 Also the fall in exports, important for the trade channel, is predicted
well: 12.63% vs. around 11% in the data for 2009Q1. The model is somewhat less
successful for the other components of GDP. Consumption is predicted to fall by half
a percent on impact. In the data, consumption falls indeed by 0.55%, but only in the
fourth quarter of 2009 and starts to recover soon after. The investment decline is
underpredicted with 2.5% vs. 8% in the data.
Since the main focus of this chapter is the comparison of the shock transmission via
the trade and the financial channel, we now consider the financial and trade shocks
separately. Both shocks have the same magnitude as before. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show
15We compare the size of the initial response to the quarter-on-quarter growth of the respective
variables in the first quarter of 2009.
61
Chapter 2
Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses to a Financial Shock.
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the responses to a financial and a trade shock, respectively. Both shocks lead to a
decline in output, hours and investment. However, the responses of other variables,
in particular bank capital and exports, differ.
In the case of the financial shock, the deteriorating value of foreign assets leads to
a decline in bank capital. This sets off an increase in the loan deposit rate spread by
about 0.6 percentage points and a fall of loans as well as deposits. A higher loan rate
discourages loan demand from the entrepreneur, while a lower deposit rate induces
the worker to save less. Exports increase slightly by less than 0.5% over four years.
At the same time imports fall, leading to higher net exports.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Responses to a Trade Shock.
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In contrast, bank capital increases in the case of the trade shock. This is driven by
a positive response of loans during the first 3 years. Loans increase due to higher
demand by entrepreneurs following a fall of the loan rate. The lower loan rate also
induces higher investment. Deposits and foreign assets on the other hand decline.
The value of foreign assets in home currency actually increases on impact, driven by
the increase of the terms-of-trade. However, foreign assets valued in foreign currency
fall on impact.
The initial increase of aggregate consumption following a trade shock is mainly
driven by an increase of entrepreneur consumption. Banker consumption also increases,
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but its share in aggregate consumption is very low. On the other hand, consumption
of workers, which constitutes the largest part of aggregate consumption, falls.
Comparing the output responses for the two shocks shows that the initial impact
is higher in case of the trade shock. While output declines by around 1% following a
financial shock, it declines by 2.3% following a trade shock. Thus, using the same
measure as before, the quarter-on-quarter growth in the first quarter of 2009, shows
that the trade shock explains more than twice as much of the actual GDP decline
than the financial shock, 66% vs. 28%.16 However, output needs a longer time to
recover from the financial shock compared to the trade shock. In the case of the
financial shock, the response of output is negative for about 5 years, while the GDP
response becomes positive after less than 2 years, when hit by the trade shock.17
Given that German output in the last quarter of 2010 was still below its level two
years before, the financial shock plays an important role for the tepid recovery.
So far, the parameter for the bank capital cost function was set at φ2 = 0.25/Y .
However, in times of uncertainty about the health of banks’ balance sheets, the costs
for falling short of the bank capital requirement might be much higher because of
“overcautious” markets. Therefore in a next step, we explore the implications of
higher costs for the bank to violate the bank capital requirement, i.e. we double φ2
to = 0.5/Y . Figure 2.8 shows how output, bank capital, and the loan-deposit spread
react in this case.
Increasing the costs associated with the bank capital requirement affects the
dynamics of bank capital and the interest rate spread, but has a smaller effect on the
dynamics of output. In all three model variants, the higher bank costs lead to higher
initial responses of the loan deposit rate spread, which is almost twice as large as in
the baseline case. The higher bank capital costs make it more expensive for the bank
to deviate from the capital requirement and, thus, bank capital reverts back to its
steady state much faster than in the baseline case. In the model variant with just
the financial shock, this leads to a stronger initial output drop, but faster recovery.
Initially, the adjustment has to be harder, but in later periods loans fall less in the
16Put differently, the trade shock accounts for 70% of the explained GDP drop, with the remaining
30% being due to the financial shock.
17This is in line with evidence by Claessens et al. (2011), who find that recessions associated with
financial disruption episodes tend to be longer than other recessions.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse Responses to Financial and Trade Shocks with Different Bank
Capital Costs.
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higher bank capital cost case.
In the other two model variants, with both shocks and just the trade shock, the
impact of increasing capital costs on the shock transmission is more muted than in
the variant with just the financial shock.
The shares of the GDP decline explained by the two shocks change somewhat
relative to the low-cost specification. Now, the trade shock explains 61% and the
financial shock 39% of the explained GDP decline.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed how the recent financial crisis was transmitted
to the German economy. For this purpose, we have employed a quantitative business
cycle model featuring trade with the rest of the world as well as a globally operating
banking sector. Calibrated to German data the model can account for key features
of regular German business cycles as well as of the recent financial crisis. It is able to
capture 95% of the output decline observed in Germany in the beginning of 2009.
Analyzing the relative importance of the two transmission channels shows that the
trade channel played a stronger role in accounting for the output drop than the
financial channel. In particular, it explains twice as much of the output decline as
the financial channel. However, since the financial channel triggers a longer-lasting
recession than the trade channel, it is mainly responsible for the duration of the crisis.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A Data Construction and Data Sources
• GDP, its components, and employment: We use quarterly German data
from the ECB for GDP, gross fixed capital formation, consumption of households
and non-profit institutions serving households, exports and imports of goods
and services, and total employment. The data runs from 1991Q1 to 2010Q4.
• Loans, deposits, and interest rates: We use data on loans and deposits
from the Bundesbank. The data on loans to domestic non-financial corporations
starts in 1999. For the business cycle statistics calculation, we use a data series
on loans to domestic enterprises and households, which is available for the
entire sample period starting in 1991. Deposits include deposits from domestic
enterprises, households and non-profit institutions. For the interest rate spread,
we combine data on deposit and loan rates from the Bundesbank (1997-2003)
and the ECB (from 2003 onwards).
Deposit rate: average rate on savings deposits with higher rates of returns,
with agreed notice of 3 months and a duration of up to and including 1 year
(Bundesbank); annualized agreed rate on deposits with agreed maturity up to 1
year from households and non-profit institutions serving households (ECB).
Loan rate: effective interest rate on long-term fixed-rate loans to enterprises
and self-employed persons of 500000 and up to 5 million Euro (Bundesbank);
annualized agreed rate on loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts,
convenience and extended credit card debt to nonfinancial corporations with a
maturity of at least 1 and up to 5 years of up to and including 1 million Euro
(ECB).
• Claims on non-residents by German banks: For claims on non-residents
by German banks we use data from the Bundesbank, which is available starting
in the second quarter of 2002.
• Change of credit standards: The bank lending survey conducted by the
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Eurosystem provides a measure for the change of credit standards.18 For this
survey 86 (now 124) banks in Euro Area including 17 (since 2008 30) German
banks are asked a set of qualitative questions. These questions ask whether
credit standards changed over the last three months and what factors affected
loan supply as well as loan demand. The data series is available starting in the
fourth quarter of 2002.
• Global demand process: To construct the global demand process, we use
data for industrial production of the 20 most important German trading partners,
as resembled by their average trade weights in total German trade over the
period 1991-2010.19 These 20 countries accounted for 81% of total German
trade. For the global demand measure, we compute the geometric average of
individual country data using the respective trade weights (see Harrison and
Oomen, 2010). The data for industrial production comes from the IMF’s IFS
database.
• Foreign asset returns: We construct the return process for foreign assets
using data on stock prices and the value of corporate debt. For the former, we
use data of the S&P 500 total return index (from DataStream), while for the
latter we use the Bank of America Merrill Lynch U.S. Corp Master Total Return
Index Value that tracks investment grade rated corporate debt, taken from
the FRED database. The two series are deflated with the U.S. GDP deflator
and weighted by the average share of equity and corporate debt in German
long-term portfolio holdings of U.S. securities. The data for German holdings
of long-term portfolio holdings of U.S. securities is taken from various reports
on foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. securities published by the Department
of the Treasury together with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• TFP process: To construct the TFP measure, we use data on the gross stock
of fixed assets from the German Federal Statistical Office,20 as well as real GDP
18For a detailed description of the survey and its purpose see ECB (2003).
19The trade weights of the main trading partners have remained relatively stable over the last
twenty years, such using average trade weights does not lead to big distortions.
20We interpolate quarterly data from the annual stock series using cubic splines.
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and total employment data from the OECD Economic Outlook database. The
capital share is set to 30%, as in the model.
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Fiscal News and Macroeconomic Volatility
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the role of news about fiscal policy, and in particular the
anticipation of tax rate changes, for business cycle fluctuations. Recent macroeconomic
research has increasingly shifted from explaining business cycle fluctuations through
contemporaneous shocks to explaining them by anticipated, or news, shocks. Rational
agents, anticipating future changes will already react today to these news (see e.g.
Beaudry and Portier, 2004, 2006; Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009; Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2010). However, most empirical studies on the effects of anticipated shocks on
business cycles have focused on news about future productivity (see e.g. Forni et al.,
2011; Fujiwara et al., 2011; Khan and Tsoukalas, 2011).1
This is remarkable for two reasons. First, fiscal measures are usually publicly
debated well in advance and often known before becoming effective, i.e. there are
considerable decision and implementation lags. A tax bill typically takes about
one year from the U.S. President’s initial proposal to the law’s enactment and
another year until the tax change becomes effective (Mertens and Ravn, 2011; Yang,
2005). As a recent example, consider the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
1There is a prominent literature branch dealing with the importance of fiscal foresight. However,
its focus has mostly been on analyzing single tax events (House and Shapiro, 2006; Parker, 1999;
Poterba, 1988) or tracing out the consequences for econometric analyses (Leeper et al., 2011;
Yang, 2005).
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(“Obamacare”), whose core contents were debated for almost one year and whose
financing provisions will only phase in gradually over time. Second, surprise fiscal
policy shocks have long been discussed as a potential prominent driver of the business
cycle (see e.g. Baxter and King, 1993; Cardia et al., 2003; Jones, 2002; McGrattan,
1994). McGrattan (1994) for example attributes one third of the U.S. business cycle
variance to distortionary taxation, while McGrattan (2011) argues that changes
in business taxation can explain one third of the output drop during the Great
Depression.2 This potential importance of fiscal policy shocks, combined with the
fact that many fiscal policy measures are known well in advance, makes fiscal news a
natural candidate for explaining aggregate fluctuations.
We add upon the previous literature by explicitly analyzing the business cycle
variance contribution of fiscal news. For this purpose, we employ a New Keynesian
DSGE model featuring several real and nominal rigidities as well as various shocks
identified as important drivers of the business cycle and augment it with a government
sector financed through distortionary labor and capital taxes. Our main focus lies
on the effects of fiscal news, but we also control for anticipation in technology,
investment-specific productivity, and the wage markup. The model is estimated by
full information (Bayesian) methods using quarterly U.S. data from 1955 to 2006.
Model-based estimation allows us to circumvent the issue of non-invertibility typically
encountered when estimating structural VARs in the presence of anticipation effects
(Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2007; Hansen and Sargent, 1991; Leeper et al., 2011).3
Computing forecast error variance decompositions, we find that while fiscal policy
accounts for 12 to 20 percent of output variance at business cycle frequencies, fiscal
news generally only plays a very limited role. Its contribution to output variance
ranges around 3 percent.
With a variance share of 10 percent at the 5 year forecast horizon, government
2Although Forni et al. (2009) find that unanticipated tax shocks contribute little to macroeconomic
fluctuations of the Euro area, this could in principle be the result of ignoring fiscal foresight.
3Non-invertibility means that the DGSE-model has a VARMA representation that cannot be
inverted to yield a finite-order VAR in the observables. Hence, the true innovations do not
perfectly map into the VAR residuals, meaning that the structural shocks cannot be recovered
using a VAR. Non-invertibility arises, e.g. when the information set of an econometrician
estimating the VAR is smaller than that of the forward-looking agents. For alternative ways
to mitigate this problem, see e.g. Sims (2009), Giannone and Reichlin (2006), and Forni et al.
(2011).
72
3.1 Introduction
spending is the fiscal variable with the largest effect on output variance. However,
this contribution only comes from surprise shocks, with anticipated spending shocks
explaining virtually nothing. Contemporaneous and anticipated capital tax shocks
each contribute 2− 3 percent to output fluctuations. However, they are considerably
more important for explaining inflation and interest rate fluctuations. Depending
on the forecast horizon, surprise capital tax shocks contribute roughly 30 percent to
their variance. Anticipated capital tax shocks are responsible for 5 to 15 percent.
The effect of contemporaneous and anticipated labor taxes, on the other hand, is
negligible.
In line with previous studies that do not consider news shocks (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2007), we find that the main drivers of the output variance are preference
and wage markup shocks. News shocks explain on average 20 percent of the variance
of output, with the main effect coming from news about TFP and investment-specific
productivity. This result conforms well with i) VAR evidence (Barsky and Sims,
2011), ii) evidence coming from a factor model (Forni et al., 2011), and iii) other
DSGE-based estimates of the importance of news shocks, who all find a similar
fraction of output fluctuations explained by anticipated shocks.
The two papers most closely related to ours are recent contributions by Mertens
and Ravn (forthcoming) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010). The former use a
VAR to analyze the business cycle contribution of narratively identified anticipated
and unanticipated tax shocks.4 They find that both types of tax shocks together
explain 20 to 25 percent of output variance, with anticipation accounting for the
majority. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) evaluate the role of news about TFP,
investment-specific technology, wage markup, and government spending shocks in an
estimated RBC model with various real rigidities. In their setup, news shocks account
for 41 percent of output fluctuations. But while they find government spending
shocks to explain 10 percent, evenly distributed across surprise, one and two year
anticipated shocks, they do not consider foresight about the financing side of the
government budget constraint.
Our paper is also related to other DSGE-based papers focusing on the effects of
4Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming) classify the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shocks according to
the time passed between the presidential signing of a bill and the tax changes becoming effective
into anticipated and contemporaneous shocks.
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anticipated technology shocks. Davis (2007), using a New Keynesian model, estimates
news shocks to be responsible for 50 percent of output fluctuations. Fujiwara et al.
(2011) extend the New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano
et al. (2005) to include news about TFP. They estimate news shocks to explain 9
percent of output variance in the unconditional variance decomposition. The paper
of Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) uses the same basic New-Keynesian model framework,
but additionally allows for news about investment-specific technology growth. In
their estimated model, both types of news shocks together account for less than
10 percent. Finally, Auray et al. (2009) estimate a New Keynesian model with an
additional durables sector, featuring news about TFP in both sectors. They find that
technology news in the non-durables sector explain 52% of output variance.
The outline of the chapter is the following. Section 2.2 introduces the DSGE-model
with fiscal foresight, while section 2.3 presents the estimation approach and results.
In section 2.4, we compute variance decompositions and impulse responses. Section
2.5 concludes.
3.2 A DSGE-Model with Fiscal Foresight
We use a medium-scale DSGE-model featuring various real and nominal frictions
as well as a variety of shocks that have been identified as important drivers of the
business cycle (see e.g. Justiniano et al., 2010a; Smets and Wouters, 2007). We
incorporate both contemporaneous and anticipated elements into the shock processes
as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) and allow for non-stationary shocks. We first
discuss the information structure of the shock processes in the next section before
describing the model in detail.
3.2.1 Shock Structure
Our model features 10 sources of stochastic fluctuations. On the government side,
we include shocks to labor and capital tax rates τn and τk, a shock to government
spending g, and a monetary policy shock ξR. The technology shocks considered
are shocks to stationary neutral productivity zt, non-stationary productivity Xt,
stationary investment-specific productivity zIt , and non-stationary investment-specific
74
3.2 A DSGE-Model with Fiscal Foresight
productivity At. In addition, the model includes a preference shock ξpreft and a wage
markup shock µwt .
The monetary policy shock and the preference shock are assumed to only contain
a contemporaneous, unanticipated component. For the other shocks, we follow the
framework proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) and allow for both con-
temporaneous shocks and shocks that are anticipated 4 and 8 periods in advance.
Anticipation horizons of 4 and 8 quarters fulfill the aim of capturing longer anticipa-
tion horizons while keeping the state space at a manageable level. This is crucial as
each additional anticipation horizon is an additional state variable. While specifically
choosing 4 and 8 quarters of anticipation might be seen as arbitrary, this assumption
can be rationalized by the workings of the political system. Four quarters of antic-
ipation are close to the average length of a tax bill from the President’s proposal
announcement to enactment (Yang, 2005). Eight quarters serves as a plausible upper
bound for the anticipation of shocks to tax rates as Congressional elections take place
every two years. We think this makes it very unlikely that people are able to correctly
predict both the reigning majority and the tax laws being implemented by the next
Congress. The same, of course, applies to spending bills. For reasons of symmetry,
we then assume this anticipation structure for all shock processes.
The general structure for shock i, i ∈
{
τn, τ k, g, z, x, zI , a, w
}
is given by
i = ε0i,t + ε4i,t−4 + ε8i,t−8 , (3.1)
where εji,t−j, j ∈ {0, 4, 8} denotes a shock to variable i that becomes known in period
t− j and hits the economy j periods later. For example, ε4τn,t−4 denotes a four period
anticipated shock to the labor tax rate that becomes known at time t−4 and becomes
effective at time t. The shocks are assumed to have mean 0, standard deviation σji ,
to be serially uncorrelated, and to be uncorrelated across anticipation horizons, i.e.
E(εji,t−j) = 0 and E(εki,tεli,t−j) = (σki )2 for j = 0, k = l, and 0 otherwise. Moreover,
they are uncorrelated across shock types im, in ∈ i, E(εkim,tεlin,t−j) = 0 ∀j, k, l and
im 6= in, .
The assumed information structure implies that agents foresee future shocks to
the extent of already known but not yet realized shocks εmi,t−j, m > j. The forward-
looking behavior of rational optimizing agents results in them reacting to anticipated
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shocks even before they are realized. By imposing a structural model on the data, this
anticipatory behavior enables the econometrician to achieve identification. However,
it is exactly this foresight that makes identifying the shocks with a VAR impossible.
The econometrician attempting to do this only uses current and past values of the
observables and thus has a smaller information set than the agents. In particular,
he is missing the anticipated but not yet realized shocks as states in his VAR.5 To
remedy this issue, structural estimation has been advocated (Blanchard et al., 2009).
We will pursue this avenue in Section 3.3 by using Bayesian methods to estimate the
proposed model.
3.2.2 Conceptualizing Tax Shocks
The tax shocks considered in the present work do not necessarily stem from actual
changes in the labor and capital tax rates. Rather, they are interpreted as the
probability weighted effect of tax actions under legislative debate or due to judicative
decisions. They are the product of the likelihood of a tax change and the size of
this effect, as perceived by rational agents forming expectations about the future
path of taxes. Hence, our definition is wider than the one considered by Mertens and
Ravn (forthcoming), who restrict their attention to the shocks directly deriving from
the legislative process. Shocks deriving from e.g. the SEC suing against the legality
of a tax shelter would be excluded from their definition but not from ours.6 Note
that news shocks are distinct from pure uncertainty about future taxes. While the
former are associated with an anticipated change in the mean of the tax rate, tax
uncertainty shocks can be conceptualized as mean-preserving spreads.7
To fix ideas, consider the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 as
an example. On June 9, 2009, a first draft of the health care bill was released. At
that time, people at the latest could anticipate that taxes were going to rise in order
to finance the bill, if it ever passed. However, both the size and the likelihood of
5Sims (2009) shows that in some cases it may be possible to recover the shocks using a structural
VAR. By including enough lags and forward-looking variables, it may be possible to move the
non-invertible root(s) close enough to unity so that the discrepancy between true structural
errors and the estimated ones becomes small.
6This notion of tax shocks is consistent with concept of “policy expectations” in McGrattan (2011).
7For an analysis of uncertainty about fiscal policy in the context of a New Keynesian model, see
Born and Pfeifer (2011); Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011).
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Figure 3.1: Intrade Daily Closing Prices: “Will ’Obamacare’ health care reform
become law in the United States?”
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Notes: This contract will settle (expire) at 100 ($10.00) if a health care reform bill is passed into
law before midnight ET 30 Jun 2010. It will settle (expire) at 0 ($0.00) if a health care reform bill
is not passed into law.
such a change was largely unknown. The first point of uncertainty changed on July
13, 2009, when the Congressional Budget Office published official cost estimates: If
passed, marginal income tax rates were going to increase by 22 percentage points
for households between 100% and 400% of the poverty level. Taking these costs as
given, households were experiencing tax shocks with changes in the likelihood of the
passage of the bill. Intrade bets on the passage of the bill show that some people
were constantly reevaluating this likelihood. Figure 3.1 presents the closing prices of
an Intrade betting contract that paid 100, if a health care reform bill was passed into
law before mid-2010 and 0 if a health care reform bill was not passed. Hence, the
closing price is a direct measure of the likelihood of a bill becoming law. There is a
large variance in the probability of passing the bill that varies with the ebb and flow
of the political process. These changes potentially act like a huge sequence of tax
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shocks for households. If one considers only the change in the likelihood from the
time directly after the Massachusetts Senate election in January to the final vote of
the bill, this amounts in expectations to a tax shock of 0.7× 22% = 15.4% during
one quarter.8
3.2.3 The Model
The model economy includes five sectors: the household sector with a large
representative household, the labor market featuring a continuum of monopolistically
competitive unions selling differentiated labor services to intermediate firms, the firm
sector including a continuum of intermediate goods firms producing intermediate
goods and a final good firm bundling the intermediate goods, and the government
sector responsible for fiscal and monetary policy.
Household Sector
The economy is populated by a large representative household with a continuum of
members. Household preferences are defined over per capita consumption Ct and per
capita labor effort Lt, where each member consumes the same amount and works the
same number of hours.9 We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) and assume that
household members supply their labor uniformly to a continuum of unions j ∈ [0, 1].
The unions are monopolistically competitive and supply differentiated labor services
lt(j) to intermediate goods firms. Overall, total labor supply of the representative
household is given by the integral over all labor markets j, i.e. Lt =
∫ 1
0 lt(j)dj. We
will discuss the labor market structure in detail below.
Following Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), we assume a preference specification that
allows to control the size of the wealth effect, but additionally assume habits in
8Unfortunately, due to the non-availability of data for the relative price of investment, our sample
does not cover this series of events.
9Due to the symmetric equilibrium, the decisions of the household members are identical. Hence,
we suppress the subscript denoting individual members.
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consumption:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξpreft
(
Ct − φcCt−1 − γ L
1+σl
t
1 + σl
St
)1−σc
− 1
1− σc . (3.2)
Here, the parameter φc ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of internal habit persistence,
σc ≥ 0 governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σl ≥ 0 is related to the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and γ ≥ 0 measures the relative disutility of labor
effort.10 The term
St = (Ct − φcCt−1)σsS1−σst−1 (3.3)
makes the preferences non-separable in both consumption and work effort. This
preference specification introduces the parameter σs ∈ (0, 1] that allows to govern the
magnitude of the wealth effect on the labor supply. As special cases, the specification
nests the preference class discussed by King et al. (1988), i.e. σs = 1, and the
preferences proposed by Greenwood et al. (1988), i.e. σs = 0, where the latter case
implies a zero wealth elasticity of labor supply. We assume the preference shock ξpreft
to follow an AR(1)-process in logs:
log ξpreft = ρpref log ξpreft−1 + εpreft . (3.4)
The household faces the budget constraint
Ct + zItAtIt +
Bt+1
Pt
= (1− τnt )
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)lt(j)dj +
(
1− τ kt
)
RKt utKt + Φt + Tt
+
(
1− τ kt
)
Ξt +
(
1− τ kt
)
(Rt−1 − 1) Bt
Pt
+ Bt
Pt
. (3.5)
Besides labor income from supplying differentiated labor services lt(j) at the real
wage Wt (j), the household has capital income from renting out capital services
utKt at the rental rate RKt , from receiving firm profits Ξt, and from investing in
bonds Bt+1, which are in zero net supply. Both forms of income are taxed at their
10In a recent paper, Nutahara (2010) shows that it is important to distinguish between internal and
external habits in a model with news shocks. He finds that internal habits are able to generate
news-driven business cycles, whereas external habits are not.
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respective tax rates τnt and τ kt . Only net returns of bonds are taxed, such that the
term
(
1− τ kt
)
(Rt−1 − 1) BtPt + BtPt is the after-tax return. In addition, the government
pays lump sum transfers.
The household spends its income on consumption Ct and investment zItAtIt, where
It denotes gross investment at the price of capital goods. We assume that the relative
price of investment in terms of the consumption good is subject to two shocks, a
stationary investment-specific productivity shock zIt and non-stationary investment-
specific technological progress At (see Greenwood et al., 1997, 2000). The relative price
of investment is equal to the technical rate of transformation between investment and
consumption goods. Changes in this price do not affect the productivity of already
installed capital, but do affect newly installed capital and become embodied in it.
For the non-stationary investment-specific technology process, we assume a random
walk with drift in its logarithm
logAt = logAt−1 + log µat . (3.6)
The drift term µat is subject to contemporaneous and anticipated shocks according to
log
(
µat
µa
)
= ρa log
(
µat−1
µa
)
+ ε0a,t + ε4a,t−4 + ε8a,t−8. (3.7)
The stationary investment-specific technology shock zIt follows an AR(1)-process
log zIt = ρzI log zIt−1 + ε0zI ,t + ε4zI ,t−4 + ε8zI ,t−8. (3.8)
Depreciation allowances are an important feature of the U.S. tax code, therefore,
we also include them in our model. They are captured by the term Φt in equation
(3.5) and have the form Φt = τ kt
∑∞
s=1 δτ (1− δτ )s−1zIt−sAt−sIt−s, where δτ is the
depreciation rate for tax purposes.11 Since depreciation allowances provide new
investment with a tax shield at historical costs, they may be important in capturing
the dynamics of investment following shocks (Christiano et al., forthcoming; Yang,
2005).
11Following Auerbach (1989), we allow the depreciation rate for tax purposes to differ from the
physical rate.
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The household members own the capital stock Kt, whose law of motion is given by
Kt+1 =
[
1−
(
δ0 + δ1 (ut − 1) + δ22 (ut − 1)
2
)]
Kt +
1− κ2
(
It
It−1
− µI
)2 It. (3.9)
Household members do not simply rent out capital, but capital services utKt, where
ut denotes capital utilization. Thus, they decide about the intensity with which the
existing capital stock is used. However, using capital with an intensity that is higher
than normal is not costless, but leads to higher depreciation of the capital stock. This is
captured by the increasing and convex function δ (ut) = δ0+δ1 (ut − 1)+δ2/2 (ut − 1)2,
with δ0, δ1, δ2 > 0. Without loss of generality, capital utilization in steady state
is normalized to 1. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we assume the presence
of investment adjustment costs S (It/It−1) = κ/2
(
It/It−1 − µI
)2
to dampen the
volatility of investment over the business cycle. κ > 0 is a parameter governing
the curvature of the investment adjustment costs and µI is the steady state growth
rate of investment, which is equal to the steady state growth rate of capital. This
specification assures that the investment adjustment costs are minimized and equal
to 0 along the balanced growth path, i.e. S = S ′ = 0 and S ′′ > 0, where the primes
denote derivatives.
The household maximizes its utility, equation (3.2), by choosing Ct, Lt, St, Bt+1,
Kt+1, ut, and It, subject to the budget constraint (3.5), the law of motion for capital
(3.9), and the resource constraint for aggregate labor given by (3.10) below.
Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by differentiated labor services and staggered
wage setting. To model these features without letting idiosyncratic wage risk affect
the household members, and thus making aggregation intractable, we assume a
continuum of unions j, j ∈ [0, 1]. The household members supply their labor lt (j)
equally to the unions, which are monopolistically competitive and supply differentiated
labor lt (j) to intermediate firms at wage Wt (j). Every period, a union j is able
to re-optimize its wage with probability (1− θw), 0 < θw < 1. A union j that is
not able to re-optimize indexes its nominal wage to the price level according to
Wt (j)Pt = (Πt−1)χwΠ¯1−χwµytWt−1 (j)Pt−1, where the parameter χw ∈ [0, 1] measures
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the degree of indexing, Π¯ is steady state gross inflation, and µyt is the gross growth
rate of output (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003). Thus, in the absence of price
adjustment the wage still partly adapts to changes in productivity and inflation
(Christiano et al., 2008), thereby assuring that no current wage contract will deviate
arbitrarily far from the current optimal wage.
Household members supply the amount of labor services that is demanded at the
current wage. Unions that can reset their wages choose the real wage that maximizes
the expected utility of its members, taking into account the demand for its labor
services lt (j) = (Wt(j)/Wt)−ηw,t Lcompt , where Lcompt is the aggregate demand for
composite labor services, the respective resource constraint
Lt = Lcompt
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)−ηw,t
dj, (3.10)
and the aggregate wage level Wt =
(∫ 1
0 Wt (j)
1−ηw,t dj
) 1
1−ηw,t . The time-varying
substitution elasticity ηw,t allows us to include a wage markup shock µwt = (ηw,t−1)−1
that follows
log
(
µwt
µw
)
= ρw log
(
µwt−1
µw
)
+ ε0w,t + ε4w,t−4 + ε8w,t−8. (3.11)
Including a wage markup shock is motivated by the finding that this shock is important
for explaining output fluctuations (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010; Smets
and Wouters, 2007).
Firm Sector
A continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms i, i ∈ [0, 1],
produces differentiated intermediate goods Yit via a Cobb-Douglas production function,
using capital services uitKit and a composite labor bundle Lcompit
Yit = zt (uitKit)α (XtLcompit )
1−α − ψXYt , (3.12)
where α is the capital share, zt is a stationary TFP shock, Xt is a non-stationary
labor augmenting productivity process, and XYt is the trend of output defined in
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Appendix B. The fixed cost of production ψ is set such that profits are 0 in steady
state and there is no entry or exit (Christiano et al., 2005). The composite labor
bundle is aggregated from differentiated labor inputs Lit (j) with a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator lcompit = [
∫ 1
0 lit(j)
ηw,t−1
ηw,t dj]
ηw,t
ηw,t−1 .
For the non-stationary labor augmenting productivity process Xt, we assume a
random walk with drift in its logarithm
logXt = logXt−1 + log µxt . (3.13)
The drift term µxt is subject to contemporaneous and anticipated shocks according to
log
(
µxt
µx
)
= ρx log
(
µxt−1
µx
)
+ ε0x,t + ε4x,t−4 + ε8x,t−8. (3.14)
Hence, in the deterministic steady state, the natural logarithm of the non-stationary
component of the neutral technology shock grows with rate µx. The stationary
technology shock zt follows an AR(1)-process with persistence ρz
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + ε0z,t + ε4z,t−4 + ε8z,t−8. (3.15)
We assume staggered price setting a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Each period,
an intermediate firm i can re-optimize its price with probability (1− θp), 0 < θp < 1.
If a firm i cannot re-optimize the price, it is indexed to inflation Πt = PtPt−1 according
to Pit+1 = (Πt)χp (Π¯)1−χpPit, where χp ∈ [0, 1] governs the degree of indexation. The
intermediate firms maximize their discounted stream of profits subject to the demand
from the final good producer, equation (3.17) below, applying the discount factor of
their owners, the household members.
The intermediate goods are bundled by a competitive final good firm to a final
good Yt using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation technology with substitution elasticity ηp
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ηp−1
ηp
it di
) ηp
ηp−1
. (3.16)
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Expenditure minimization yields the optimal demand for intermediate good i as
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ηp
Yt ∀ i. (3.17)
Government Sector
Government expenditures are financed by taxing profits and the return to capital
services at the rate τ kt and labor income at the rate τnt . Following McGrattan (1994)
and Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming), we model average tax rates as AR(2)-processes
τnt = (1− ρn1 − ρn2 ) τn + ρn1τnt−1 + ρn2τnt−2 + ε0τn,t + ε4τn,t−4 + ε8τn,t−8, (3.18)
τ kt =
(
1− ρk1 − ρk2
)
τ k + ρk1τ kt−1 + ρk2τ kt−2 + ε0τk,t + ε4τk,t−4 + ε8τk,t−8, (3.19)
where τ k, τn ∈ [0, 1) are parameters determining the unconditional mean. We are
aware that using average effective tax rates for capital and labor income may be
problematic for several reasons. First, the U.S. tax code does not allow for a clean
division between labor and capital taxation, which are theoretical constructs.12 Second,
using average effective tax rates may be particularly problematic for progressive labor
income taxes, where marginal tax rates rather than effective tax rates influence
peoples’ behavior. Nevertheless, due to data availability issues13 and comparability
with the existing literature, we follow the path set forward by Mendoza et al. (1994),
Jones (2002), and Leeper et al. (2010) and construct average effective tax rates for
capital and labor income. While this is clearly a simplifying assumption, it can be
justified on grounds that dynamics of marginal and average tax rates are very similar
(Mendoza et al., 1994).
Government spending Gt, which may be thought of as entering the utility function
additively separable, displays a stochastic trend XGt . Log deviations of government
spending from its trend are assumed to follow an AR(1)-process
log
(
gt
g¯
)
= ρg log
(
gt−1
g¯
)
+ 0g,t + 4g,t−4 + 8g,t−8, (3.20)
12For example, the personal income tax applies to both sources of income.
13In principle, it would be desirable to e.g. use the Barro and Sahasakul (1983) average marginal
tax rates as extended by Barro and Redlick (2011). However, they are only available at annual
frequency.
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where gt = GtXGt denotes detrended government spending and ρg is the persistence
parameter.
The stochastic trend in Gt is assumed to be cointegrated with the trend in output.
This assures that the output share of government spending Gt/Yt is stationary, while
at the same time allowing the trend in Gt to be smoother than the one in Yt. In
particular,
XGt =
(
XGt−1
)ρxg(
XYt−1
)1−ρxg
. (3.21)
Lump sum transfers Tt are used to balance the budget. Thus, the government
budget constraint is given by14
Gt + Tt = τnt WtL
comp
t + τ kt
(
RKt utKt + Ξt
)
− Φt. (3.22)
We close the model by assuming that the central bank follows a Taylor rule that
reacts to inflation and output growth:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR (Πt
Π¯
)φRΠ ( Yt
Yt−1
1
µy
)φRY 1−ρR exp (ξRt ) , (3.23)
where ρR is a smoothing parameter introduced to capture the empirical evidence of
gradual movements in interest rates (see e.g. Clarida et al., 2000). The parameters
φRY and φRΠ capture the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to deviations
of inflation and output growth from their steady state values. We assume that the
central bank responds to changes in output rather than its level as this conforms
better with empirical evidence and avoids the need to define a measure of trend
growth that the central bank can observe (see Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007). ξRt is
the i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
3.3 Model Estimation
We use a Bayesian approach as described in An and Schorfheide (2007) and
Fernández-Villaverde (2010). Specifically, we use the Kalman filter to obtain the
14Note that private bonds are in zero net supply.
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likelihood from the state-space representation of the model solution and the Tailored
Randomized Block Metropolis-Hastings (TaRB-MH) algorithm (Chib and Rama-
murthy, 2010) to maximize the posterior likelihood.15
3.3.1 Data
We use quarterly U.S. data from 1955:Q1 until 2006:Q4 and include twelve ob-
servable time series: the growth rates of per capita GDP, consumption, investment,
wages and government expenditure, all in real terms, the logarithm of the level of
per capita hours worked, the growth rates of the relative price of investment and
of total factor productivity, the log difference of the GDP deflator, and the federal
funds rate. Since our main objective are the effects of tax shocks, we also include
capital and labor tax rates.16 Figure 3.2 displays the evolution of the tax rates and
the government spending to GDP ratio over our sample. All three series show a
large persistence. Tests against the null hypothesis of a unit root in both tax rates
are borderline significant, while they cannot reject the null of a unit root in the
government spending to GDP ratio. As there are theoretical reasons to believe that
both the tax rates and the government spending to GDP ratio do not contain unit
roots, we treat them as stationary. However, to account for the relatively persistent
deviations from the unconditional mean, we allow the trend in Gt to be smoother
than the one in Yt.17
3.3.2 Fixed Parameters
Prior to estimation, we fix a number of parameters to match sample means (see
Table 3.1). The curvature of the utility function σc is set to 2. This value is consistent
with most DSGE models. The discount factor β is fixed at 0.99. We set the parameter
15We used a t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom as proposal density. The posterior distribution
was computed from a 10,000 draw Monte Carlo Markov Chain, where the first 2,500 draws were
discarded as burn-in draws.
16Detailed data sources and the observation equation that describes how the empirical time series
are matched to the corresponding model variables can be found in Appendices D and C.
17We think that the government spending to GDP ratio actually displays mean reversion. Since
the end of our sample in 2006Q4, it has returned to about 20.5 in 2010 and is thus close to its
unconditional mean.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of the Tax Rates and the Spending to GDP Ratio.
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Notes: The top panel shows the evolution of the labor tax rate series (τn), the middle panel the
evolution of the capital tax rate series (τk), and the bottom panel the evolution of the spending to
GDP ratio (G/Y ).
that governs the disutility of labor effort γ such that labor effort in steady state is
20%. We assume an annual physical depreciation rate of 10%, which corresponds to a
δ0 of 0.025 per quarter. Following Auerbach (1989) and Mertens and Ravn (2011), we
set the depreciation rate for tax purposes δτ to twice the rate of physical depreciation,
i.e. 0.05. The depreciation parameter δ1 is fixed to set the steady state capacity
utilization to 1 (Christiano et al., 2005). The parameter α is 0.2935, which matches
the capital share in output over our sample, and the fixed cost parameter ψ is set to
ensure zero profits in steady state. We assume a steady state price and wage markup
of 11% and thus set ηp and ηw to 10.
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Table 3.1: Parameters Fixed Prior to Estimation
Parameter Value Target/Motivation (matched to quarterly data)
σc 2 Common in RBC models
γ 0.0216 Set labor effort in steady state to 20%
β 0.99 Common in RBC models
δ0 0.025 Annual physical depreciation of 10%
δ1 0.0486 Set capacity utilization u = 1 in steady state
δτ 0.05 Twice the rate of physical depreciation δ0 (Auerbach, 1989)
α 0.2935 Match capital share in output
ψ 0.0432 Set profits to zero
ηp 10 Set price markup to 11% in steady state
ηw 10 Set wage markup to 11% in steady state
µy 1.0045 Match average sample growth rate of per capita output
µa 0.9957 Match average sample growth rate of relative price of investment
τn 0.1984 Match average sample labor tax rate
τ k 0.3880 Match average sample capital tax rate
G/Y 0.2031 Match average sample mean
Π¯ 1.0089 Match average sample mean
The steady state gross growth rates of per capita output µy and of the relative
price of investment µa are set to their sample means of 1 + 0.45% and 1 − 0.43%.
The parameters τ k and τn, which determine the unconditional mean of the tax rates,
equal the post-war sample means of 0.388 and 0.1984. We set the steady state ratio of
government spending to output G/Y to 0.2031, which also corresponds to the sample
mean. The steady state inflation rate corresponds to the average sample mean of
1.0089, i.e. annual inflation of 3.6%
3.3.3 Priors
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the prior distributions. Where available, we use prior
values that are standard in the literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007) and inde-
pendent of the underlying data. The autoregressive parameters of the tax processes,
ρn1 , ρ
n
2 , ρ
k
1, ρ
k
2, are essentially left unrestricted, but we impose stability of the AR(2)-
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processes.18 The other autoregressive parameters, ρi, i ∈
{
pref, g, z, x, zI , a, w
}
, are
assumed to follow a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. We
assume the standard deviations of the shocks to follow inverse-gamma distributions
with prior means 0.1 and standard deviations 2. For the parameters of the Taylor-
rule, φRΠ and φRY , we impose gamma distributions with a prior mean of 1.5 and
0.5, respectively, while the interest rate smoothing parameter ρR has the same prior
distribution as the persistence parameters of the shock processes. The habit parameter
φc is assumed to be beta distributed with a prior mean of 0.7, which is standard in
the literature. Following Justiniano et al. (2010b), the parameter determining the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply σl is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with
a prior mean of 2 and a standard deviation of 0.75. The prior distribution for the
parameter governing the wealth elasticity of labor supply σs is a beta distribution
with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. We impose an inverse-gamma distribution
with prior mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.15 for δ2/δ1, the elasticity of
marginal depreciation with respect to capacity utilization. The parameters governing
the indexation of prices and wages, χp and χw, each are beta distributed with mean
0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. For the Calvo parameters θw and θp we assume a beta
distribution with a prior mean of 0.5, which corresponds to price and wage contracts
having an average length of half a year (Smets and Wouters, 2007). Finally, we follow
the literature (e.g. Justiniano et al., 2010a; Smets and Wouters, 2007) and impose a
gamma prior with mean 4 for the parameter controlling investment adjustment costs
κ.
3.3.4 Posterior Distribution
The last four columns of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 display the mean, the standard deviation
and the 90%-posterior intervals for each of the estimated parameters. Most estimated
parameters and shock processes are in line with previous studies on the determinants
of business cycle fluctuations, both with those using only contemporaneous shocks
(e.g. Justiniano et al., 2010a; Smets and Wouters, 2007) as well as those including
18Specifically, we impose a uniform prior for each of the corresponding autoregressive roots over the
stability region (−1,+1). Let ξ1 and ξ2 be the roots of such an AR(2)-process. The autoregressive
parameters corresponding to these roots can be recovered from: ρ1 = ξ1 + ξ2 and ρ2 = −ξ1ξ2 .
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contemporaneous and anticipated shocks (Fujiwara et al., 2011; Khan and Tsoukalas,
2011; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010).
However, some estimates deserve further comment. We find a considerable degree
of internal habits with φc = 0.86, which is right between the estimates obtained by
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010). The posterior mean
of the parameter governing the wealth elasticity (σs = 0.1) implies a relatively low
wealth elasticity of labor supply and, thus, preferences that are close to the ones
proposed by Greenwood et al. (1988).19 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) find an
even lower wealth elasticity of almost zero. Khan and Tsoukalas (2011), on the other
hand, estimate the wealth elasticity of labor to be quite high at 0.85. A possible
explanation for these differing estimates is the inclusion of government spending as
an observable. Increases in government spending may entail positive consumption
responses (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Galí et al., 2007), a behavior which can
be explained by a New-Keynesian model with a low wealth elasticity (Monacelli
and Perotti, 2008). Even in studies finding a negative consumption response (see
e.g. Ramey, 2011), this negative response tends to be relatively small or hardly
distinguishable from 0, also suggesting the presence of a low wealth effect. Including
government spending as an observable restricts the parameter governing the wealth
elasticity to a low value. In our model, this happens although the consumption
response to a government spending shock is estimated to be negative. On the other
hand, without the observable government spending as in Khan and Tsoukalas (2011),
this parameter remains mostly unrestricted with regard to the effects of government
spending on consumption.20
Turning to the nominal rigidities in our model, we find that prices are on average
adjusted about every three quarters, while the Calvo parameter for wages implies a
high degree of wage stickiness. The degree of price indexation is low (χp = 0.06) and
in a similar range as in Justiniano et al. (2011). Wages, on the other hand, are indexed
to inflation with a higher proportion than prices (χw = 0.6), which corresponds well
with the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2007).
19Note, however, that in the presence of habits, even a value of σs = 0 still implies the presence of
a wealth effect, see Monacelli and Perotti (2008).
20A small wealth effect also helps in explaining the empirical behavior of labor market variables
(Galí et al., 2011).
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The parameters of the Taylor rule are in line with previous estimates (e.g. Clarida
et al., 2000). They imply a high degree of interest rate smoothing (ρR = 0.86), a
strong response to inflation (φRΠ = 2.96), and a moderate value for the standard
deviation of the monetary policy shock (σR = 0.251%).
With the exception of the non-stationary technology shock, all shocks are estimated
to be highly persistent, with AR(1)-coefficients ranging from 0.94 for the government
spending shock to 0.99 for the preference, the stationary technology, and the non-
stationary investment-specific technology shock. The non-stationary productivity
component has a relatively low serial correlation of 0.34, a value commonly found in
the literature (e.g. Justiniano et al., 2011).
The contemporaneous shock as well as the 4 quarter anticipated non-stationary
technology shock have relatively low standard deviations of 0.04% and 0.03%, re-
spectively, whereas the two year anticipated shock is the most important one with a
standard deviation of 0.6%. A similar pattern emerges for the stationary technology
shock. In this case, however, the standard deviation of the unanticipated component
has a similar size as the 8 quarter anticipated component, 0.74% and 0.73%, whereas
the 4 quarter anticipated shock is less important with a standard deviation of 0.18%.
Examining investment-specific technology shows that investment-specific growth
displays the same pattern as neutral technology growth. The shock with the longest
anticipation horizon is the most important one, having the highest standard deviation
(σ8a = 0.14%), albeit in this case it is only slightly higher than the one for the
contemporaneous shock (σ0a = 0.11). The 4 quarter anticipated shock, on the other
hand, is negligible (σ4a = 0.04%). In contrast, for stationary investment-specific
technology anticipation does not play a role, the standard deviations are less than
0.05%, while the unanticipated stationary shock component has a higher standard
deviation than the unanticipated non-stationary investment-specific technology shock
(σ0zI = 0.31%).
Another shock, where the anticipated shock components are negligible, is the wage
markup shock. While the standard deviation of the unanticipated shock is relatively
high, the anticipated shocks have very low standard deviations that are below 0.04%.
In contrast, the surprise wage markup shock has a high standard deviation of almost
46%, which is consistent with evidence from Smets and Wouters (2007) and Galí et al.
91
Chapter 3
(2011), who showed this shock to be the most important driver of business cycles.21
Next, we direct our focus to the fiscal policy shock processes. Both tax processes
show a very high persistence, with the roots of the autoregressive processes implying
autoregressive parameters of ρn1 = 0.770, ρn2 = 0.228, ρk1 = 1.604, and ρk2 = −0.605,
respectively.22 The posterior estimates suggest that for government spending and
labor taxes fiscal foresight is rather limited. The unanticipated government spending
shock has a volatility of 3%, a value also found by Leeper et al. (2010). The volatilities
of the anticipated shock components, on the other hand, are rather small, σ4g = 0.03%
and σ8g = 0.04%. A similar pattern emerges for the labor tax process τnt . The shock
with the largest volatility is the unanticipated component ε0τn,t with 0.48%, while the
anticipated components have a similar size as the anticipated government spending
shocks. Only for the capital tax rate, news shocks display a higher standard deviation.
Particularly, compared to the shocks to the labor tax process, the shocks εiτk,t−i to the
capital tax process τ kt display a much higher volatility. The unanticipated component
ε0τk,t has the highest standard deviation of 0.92%, while the anticipated components
have smaller, but still sizeable standard deviation, σ4τk = 0.46% and σ8τk = 0.65%.
Table 3.4 compares empirical moments of the data to the corresponding moments
from the model. Overall, the model is able to replicate the sample moments fairly
well.
3.4 Business Cycle Effects of Fiscal News
We are now in a position to analyze the dynamic effects of fiscal news. Given
the estimated deep parameters of the model, we compute forecast error variance
decompositions to trace out the shocks’ contributions to business cycle volatility.
To better understand the dynamic effects of news shocks, we then analyze their
transmission into the economy in Section 3.4.2.
21Note that the shock applies to the net markup so a 46% shock increases the markup from 11%
to about 16%. Chari et al. (2009) point out that wage markup shocks cannot be distinguished
from labor supply shocks. For policy makers this distinction matters, since both shocks entail
different policy implications (Galí et al., 2011). However, as we are not interested in optimal
policy, it is not important to identify the two shocks separately.
22The high persistence of the labor tax rate has, for example, been documented in Cardia et al.
(2003).
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3.4.1 Variance Decomposition
Results
We use our estimated model to analyze the quantitative importance of the different
anticipated and surprise shocks for explaining business cycles. To this end, we
compute conditional and unconditional forecast error variance decompositions for the
growth rates of output, consumption, investment, hours, wages, the Federal funds
rate, and inflation (see Table 3.5).23
Overall, we find that news shocks on average explain between 10 and 30 percent of
the variance of the variables considered. However, fiscal foresight only plays a very
limited role. Of the three types of fiscal foresight we consider, only the anticipated
capital tax shock has a sizeable variance contribution. While news about future capital
taxes contribute only 2 percent to output growth variance, they matter for inflation
and interest rate variability, explaining more than 10 percent of the variability of
inflation and interest rates at forecast horizons longer than three years. This makes
them the third largest source of inflation and interest rate volatility, only behind
preference and unanticipated capital tax shocks. Together, surprise and anticipated
capital tax shocks explain around 40 to 50 percent of inflation and interest rate
fluctuations. In contrast, news about labor tax and government spending shocks
explain at most 0.01 percent of the variance of any of the seven variables considered.
More important than fiscal foresight are the surprise components of the fiscal
variables. As already noted, besides the preference shock, the surprise capital tax
shock is the most important factor for the variance of the Federal funds rate and
inflation. Moreover, it accounts for 2 to 3 percent of output fluctuations. While the
surprise government spending shock ε0g accounts for almost 10 percent of the output
growth variance at the five year horizon and even more at shorter horizons, it hardly
contributes anything to the other variables’ fluctuations.
Whereas fiscal foresight seems to be of only minor importance for the fluctuations
of output, consumption, and investment, other news shocks contribute significantly
to their variance. The news shocks that matter most are news about stationary
23For ease of exposition we have combined the two anticipated shock components into one and
left out three anticipated shocks (stationary investment-specific, wage markup, and government
spending) that each contributed less than 0.01 percent to the variance of the variables.
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technology, which account for 8 to 12 percent of the variance of output and consump-
tion. News about non-stationary technology mostly affects the volatility of wages,
predominantly at long horizons. At the five year horizon, it is the single most impor-
tant factor affecting wage volatility. News about non-stationary investment-specific
technology explain around 8 percent of the variance of investment at all horizons
and about the same amount of the variance of hours (at the five year horizon). In
contrast, the news components of stationary investment-specific technology and the
wage markup shock account for at most 0.01 percent of the variance of any variable
we consider.
In general, the importance of news shocks increases at longer forecast horizons.
E.g., anticipated shocks account for a larger share of output volatility at the five year
horizon (21%) than at the one year horizon (11%).
Turning to the surprise shocks, we find the most important drivers of business
cycles to be wage markup, preference, and unanticipated technology shocks. At
business cycle frequencies, these shocks combined explain about 60 to 70 percent of
the fluctuations of real variables. E.g., at the 20 period forecast horizon, these three
shocks account for 31, 21, and 16 percent of output volatility, respectively. Inflation
and interest rate variability are mostly explained by preference and capital tax
shocks, whereas wage fluctuations are mainly driven by technology shocks, especially
anticipated non-stationary technology shocks. Lastly, the monetary policy shock
plays a minor role in accounting for macroeconomic fluctuations, a result similar to
Smets and Wouters (2007). It explains around 15 percent of the Federal funds rate
volatility, but only at the short term, i.e. horizons of about one year, and has much
smaller contributions for the other variables.
Discussion
Using a DSGE-based estimation approach to determine the importance of news
about fiscal policy, we find that fiscal foresight only plays a minor role in explaining
business cycle fluctuations. Specifically, using full information Bayesian estimation
and accounting for different kinds of shocks, we find tax shocks and, in particular,
news about taxes to explain less than 3 percent of output growth fluctuations. This
compares to about 25 percent in the VAR study of Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming),
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indicating that the rigid anticipation structure and the strict exogeneity assumption
in the latter paper may be problematic (see also Leeper et al., 2011).
Our estimates also attribute less than one third of output fluctuations to surprise
tax shocks, which was found by McGrattan (1994). However, her paper only featured
TFP, government spending, and tax rate shocks. In contrast, our analysis features a
richer set of shocks commonly thought to be essential for explaining business cycles
(Chari et al., 2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007).
Regarding the evidence on the effects of news shocks on the business cycles, our
result of 10 to 30 percent of the variance of output growth being attributable to
anticipated shocks squares well with the evidence found by Forni et al. (2011) and
Barsky and Sims (2011). Using a factor model, Forni et al. (2011) find that around 20
percent of output volatility is explained by technology and 10 percent by news about
technology, while Barsky and Sims (2011), in a VAR, attribute 10 to 40 percent to
news shocks.
Fujiwara et al. (2011) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2011), using an estimated DSGE
model with nominal rigidities, find a technology news contribution to output variance
of 8.5 and 1.6 percent, respectively, which is lower than our own estimates. On
the other hand, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) find that news about technology
account for as much as 41 percent of output variance. Part of this higher number
can be attributed to the absence of nominal rigidities in their model (Khan and
Tsoukalas, 2011). Overall and consistent with these studies, news shocks contribute
a higher share to the unconditional variance of nominal variables (wages, inflation,
interest rate) than to the variance of real variables (output, consumption, investment,
hours). However, allowing anticipation not only for TFP but also for other shocks,
leads to a higher relative contribution of news shocks. Whereas the contribution of
anticipated shocks in the study by Fujiwara et al. (2011) ranges from 4 percent (to the
variance of investment) to 15 percent (to inflation volatility), we find contributions
of anticipated shocks (combining all shocks) between 19 percent (investment and
consumption volatility) and 52 percent (variance of wages).
Turning to the role of unanticipated shocks, we see that while the investment-
specific technology shock has been identified as an important driver of business cycles
by previous studies (Davis, 2007; Fisher, 2006; Justiniano et al., 2010a), it is of lesser
95
Chapter 3
importance in our case and contributes a smaller fraction to fluctuations than TFP
shocks. The contributions of non-stationary investment-specific productivity vary
between 5 and 15 percent, whereas stationary investment-specific technology explains
hardly 1 percent. The difference to the previous studies finding the high contribution of
investment-specific technology stems from our decision to include the relative price of
investment as an observable. Recent studies including the relative price of investment
as an observable find similarly small contributions of investment-specific technology
(Justiniano et al., 2011; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010).24 However, we have to stress
that both the stationary as well as the non-stationary investment-specific productivity
shock pertain to the relative price of investment and are accordingly mapped to this
observable.25 Thus, our stationary investment-specific technology shock is not directly
comparable to the stationary investment-specific technology shock in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2010). This could explain the starkly differing results regarding the effects
of this particular shock for output and investment fluctuations, 30 to 60 percent in
their case vs. less than 1 percent in our case.
3.4.2 Impulse Responses
In order to better understand what drives the results of the previous section, we
analyze the impulse responses to stationary TFP shocks and to capital tax rate shocks.
We choose to focus on these shocks as they are the technology and fiscal policy shock,
respectively, where the anticipated component contributes most to business cycle
variance.26
Figure 3.3 shows the impulse responses to an unanticipated (solid line) and an
eight period anticipated (dashed line) one percentage point cut of the capital tax
rate.27 The top left panel shows the impulse response for the capital tax rate that is
24Models that do not use the relative price of investment as an observable variable usually imply
wrong moments for this series (Justiniano et al., 2011). When this problem is eliminated, the
variance contribution of investment-specific technology shocks tends to disappear.
25The observation equation in Appendix C shows the exact mapping.
26Although we find the preference and wage markup shocks to be the most important drivers of
business cycles, we omit analyzing their impulse responses as their importance and behavior
is already well understood (see e.g. Galí et al., 2011; Smets and Wouters, 2007). The impulse
responses to a government spending news shock are very similar to the ones in Ramey (2011),
albeit the negative response of private consumption is more persistent in our setup.
27For the surprise shock, this roughly corresponds to a one standard deviation shock as σ0τk = 0.923%.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Capital Tax Shocks
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Notes: solid line: impulse responses to an unanticipated 1 percentage point cut of the capital tax
rate τk; dashed line: impulse responses to an eight period anticipated 1 percentage point cut of the
capital tax rate τk that becomes known at t = −8 and effective at t = 0. All impulse responses are
semi-elasticities and measured in percent. Inflation and the policy rate are measured as gross rates
so that the responses can be interpreted as percentage point changes.
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shocked. The actual response of the exogenous capital tax rate is the same after the
surprise and anticipated tax shock, because the only difference between the two cases
is the time at which the tax change that happens at t = 0 is known. But the other
variables react differently, because with anticipation the future realization of the tax
rate is already known at t = −8 and agents immediately start to optimally respond
to this information.
First, consider the solid line representing the impulse responses to a surprise 1
percentage point decrease in the capital tax rate. This tax cut acts expansionary and
leads to an increase in output, investment, and consumption on impact. The effect is
quite large due to the strong estimated persistence of the shock process. Consistent
with the evidence of high multipliers for tax rates (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Romer
and Romer, 2010), an initial 1 percentage point decrease in the capital tax rate leads
to a peak output response of 1.25 percent. Labor and capital services increase in a
hump shaped manner after the realization. For capital services, this is driven by the
higher after-tax rental rate that can be earned after the tax cut. Note that the gross
value of the rental rate decreases, reflecting the decreased tax wedge. The increase
in capital services also raises the marginal product of labor, leading to an initial
jump in the real wage as a fraction of unions is able to reset wages in the current
period and to a further rise over time when additional unions are able to reset their
nominal wages. The initial increase of the real wage is amplified by an overshooting
of the nominal wage, which is indexed to past inflation, due to a drop in inflation.
Current inflation falls due to the positive supply side effect of the tax decrease. This
positive effect on inflation is also the reason why the policy rate falls considerably,
accommodating the expansion and further fueling investment and consumption.
Although the impulse responses for the eight period anticipated tax shock look very
similar, there are two major differences. First, agents have more time to adjust and
already react during the anticipation phase. Hence, the impulse responses are now
more drawn out. Reacting immediately to an anticipated tax shock is optimal for
the agents, because the estimated degrees of consumption habits, capital adjustment
costs, capital utilization, and nominal rigidities imply that large abrupt changes in
For the eight period anticipated shock, σ8τk = 0.645%, so that we have re-scaled the size of this
shock to make both shocks comparable. Note that the impulse responses are semi-elasticities, i.e.
they are measured in percent of the steady state values of the corresponding variables.
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important choice variables are welfare reducing and must be avoided. As a result of
these more gradual and hence more resource-saving responses, the peak responses of
all variables are now higher than for the case of a comparable surprise tax cut and
generally occur earlier relative to the shock realization at t=0. Note that relative
to the announcement of the shocks, i.e. the point in time where the horizon for the
forecast error variance decomposition starts,28 the peak responses generally occur
later for the news shocks. This peak response at later horizons for news shocks
explains why their importance in the forecast error variance decomposition tends to
be larger at later horizons.
Second, in contrast to the unanticipated shock, agents now substitute labor services
for capital services, leading to an immediate increase in the former and a decrease
in the latter. Only when the tax shock realizes, there is a jump in capital services.
The higher production resulting from the increase in labor services and the resources
saved through the initially lower depreciation resulting from the weaker capital use
allows to increase consumption during the anticipation phase. The net result of this
substitution of labor for capital services with the simultaneous increase in consumption
and investment expenditures is a slight inflationary pressure in the first period. As a
response, the central bank somewhat tightens its policy. However, the negative supply
side effect of the input substitution subsides with the subsequent further increase in
labor supply. This increase is driven by the household’s desire to increase the physical
capital stock through investment while also keeping up consumption. As a result,
inflationary pressures abate and give room to an accommodating policy stance.
Note that physical investment in the capital stock slightly decreases initially. This
behavior is due to the depreciation allowances, whose present value for new investment
decreases with the future tax bill from which it is deducted. But, in contrast to
the results of Mertens and Ravn (2011), this incentive to disinvest is rather mild.
Hence, in our estimated model, the announcement of a tax cut is insufficient to
generate the investment-driven slump during the anticipation phase of a tax cut
found in their model. This difference can be explained by the different estimation
procedures used. Mertens and Ravn (2011) rely on an impulse response matching
technique, where the empirical impulse responses were derived from a VAR using a
28I.e. t=-8 for the anticipated shock and t=0 for the surprise shock.
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narrative identification scheme. The impulse responses to be matched by the model
were only the ones to anticipated and unanticipated labor and capital tax shocks.
In contrast, our estimation uses full information techniques and thus tries to match
all moments given the full set of exogenous driving forces of the model. While the
crucial investment adjustment cost and capital utilization cost parameters are actually
estimated to generate a drop in investment as in Mertens and Ravn (2011), it is
the monetary policy response that dampens this drop. When setting the output
coefficient in the Taylor rule to 0 and the inflation response to 2, the investment
response becomes stronger and leads to an initial drop in output with a subsequent
boom. This indicates the importance of controlling for the stance of monetary policy
when tracing out the effects of fiscal shocks.29
Figure 3.4 displays the impulse responses to one standard deviation surprise (solid
line) and anticipated (dashed line) stationary TFP shocks.30 The result of a surprise
increase in total factor productivity is a prolonged boom driven by both consumption
and investment. Consistent with a typical supply side shock, inflation decreases
considerably with the central bank lowering the policy rate by 20 basis points in
response. This in turn leads to an increase in the real wage and a subsequent increase
in the labor services used.
For the eight period anticipated increase in technology, we observe an immediate
increase in output, investment, and consumption during the anticipation phase due
to the entailed wealth effect. This boom occurs already before the technology has
actually increased and is fueled by a rise in both capital and labor services.31 In this
regard, the response differs from the response to an anticipated capital tax shock,
where a substitution of capital services for labor services is observed. The reason for
the difference is that, for the anticipated TFP shock, agents have a stronger incentive
to increase investment during the anticipation phase. In contrast, for the anticipated
capital tax shock, investment falls slightly on announcement due to the decrease in
the present value of the depreciation allowances.
29On this issue, see also Leeper (2010).
30We scaled the news shock by 1.03 to have exactly the same standard deviation as the surprise
shock.
31This observation is consistent with Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), who show theoretically that
a low estimated wealth elasticity of labor supply facilitates positive comovement of output,
consumption, and hours in response to TFP news.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Stationary TFP
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Notes: solid line: impulse responses to an unanticipated one standard deviation increase in stationary
TFP z; dashed line: impulse responses to an eight period anticipated one standard deviation increase
in stationary TFP z that becomes known at t = −8 and effective at t = 0. All impulse responses
are semi-elasticities and measured in percent. Inflation and the policy rate are measured as gross
rates so that the responses can be interpreted as percentage point changes. 101
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Lastly, to better understand the contribution of capital tax and stationary TFP
shocks to business cycle variance, it is worth comparing the relative size and persistence
of the impulse responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate to these
shocks. As can be seen from the the upper right panels of Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the
peak response of output to an average TFP shock is about 80% higher than to an
average capital tax shock, although the latter is somewhat more persistent.32 This
difference in the size of the output responses explains why stationary TFP shocks are
more important for the volatility of output than capital tax shocks. In contrast, both
the inflation and the policy rate responses to capital tax shocks have higher peaks
and show more persistence. In particular, the average surprise TFP shock leads to a
peak reduction in the nominal interest rate of -0.2%, while the average surprise tax
shock leads to a drop of -0.4%. As this larger response is also more persistent, the
difference in response sizes explains why capital taxes are rather important for the
variance of inflation and the nominal interest rate, while they are less important for
explaining output variance.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyzed the contribution of fiscal foresight about labor and
capital tax rates and government spending to business cycle volatility in an estimated
New Keynesian DSGE model. Computing forecast error variance decompositions, we
found that fiscal foresight only plays a limited role for business cycle fluctuations. Its
variance contribution was mostly confined to inflation and interest rate fluctuations,
where anticipated capital tax shocks were responsible for between 5 and 15 percent
of the total variance.
Our results show that accounting for fiscal foresight does not qualitatively alter
the importance of traditional business cycle factors like technology, wage markup,
and preference shocks (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007).
Structural estimation always runs the risk of misspecifying the underlying model
structure. Hence, future work should test whether the results obtained here are robust
32Note also that the average anticipated capital tax shock is roughly 40% smaller than the one
depicted due to re-scaling.
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against the specification of different fiscal rules where taxes respond to debt and
possibly output as in Leeper et al. (2010) and Forni et al. (2009). Similarly, it might
be worthwhile to explore the effects of a more detailed modeling of the U.S. tax code
as suggested by McGrattan (2011). However, given the need for non-linear modeling
and filtering required in this case and the typically large state space of models with
anticipation effects, estimating the effects of fiscal news in such a model will be
an extremely challenging computational task. Finally, the role of the information
structure assumed in the present work should be further scrutinized as the particular
choice of information structures may matter (Leeper and Walker, 2011).
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A Tables
Table 3.2: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Preference and Technology Parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 Percent 95 Percent
φc Beta 0.7 0.1 0.858 0.014 0.834 0.880
σl Gamma 2 0.75 3.410 0.452 2.704 4.132
σs Beta 0.5 0.2 0.101 0.023 0.069 0.137
κ Gamma 4 1.5 4.860 0.425 4.128 5.526
δ2/δ1 Inverse-Gamma 0.5 0.15 0.280 0.023 0.243 0.316
χw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.590 0.069 0.486 0.704
χp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.059 0.024 0.022 0.098
θw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.938 0.006 0.927 0.948
θp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.662 0.009 0.646 0.676
Table 3.3: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 Percent 95 Percent
Preference Shock
ρpref Beta 0.5 0.2 0.991 0.003 0.987 0.996
σpref Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 40.383 11.382 22.511 57.325
Wage Markup Shock
ρw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.976 0.006 0.967 0.986
σ0w Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 45.692 7.160 34.538 58.147
σ4w Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.018 0.020 0.058
σ8w Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.032 0.017 0.023 0.045
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Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes - Continued
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 Percent 95 Percent
Stationary Technology Shock
ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.994 0.004 0.989 0.999
σ0z Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.738 0.043 0.663 0.806
σ4z Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.178 0.161 0.024 0.394
σ8z Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.730 0.047 0.648 0.804
Non-stationary Technology Shock
ρx Beta 0.5 0.2 0.336 0.059 0.245 0.438
σ0x Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.040 0.024 0.024 0.061
σ4x Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.034 0.015 0.021 0.047
σ8x Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.601 0.028 0.554 0.645
Stationary Investment-Specific Productivity Shock
ρzI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.968 0.019 0.942 0.992
σ0zI Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.313 0.021 0.274 0.342
σ4zI Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.034 0.015 0.025 0.053
σ8zI Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.017 0.023 0.053
Non-stationary Investment-Specific Productivity Shock
ρa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.986 0.0062 0.9766 0.996
σ0a Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.114 0.011 0.095 0.130
σ4a Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.036 0.013 0.020 0.056
σ8a Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.139 0.013 0.117 0.160
Taylor Rule and Monetary Policy Shock
ρR Beta 0.5 0.2 0.865 0.009 0.851 0.879
φRΠ Gamma 1.5 3 2.958 0.107 2.779 3.126
φRY Gamma 0.5 3 0.314 0.050 0.235 0.402
σR Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.251 0.011 0.234 0.268
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Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes - Continued
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 Percent 95 Percent
Government Spending Shock
ρg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.940 0.017 0.912 0.968
ρxg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.912 0.102 0.864 0.984
σ0g Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 3.024 0.124 2.815 3.217
σ4g Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.033 0.012 0.025 0.044
σ8g Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.038 0.023 0.025 0.058
Labor Tax Shock
ξn1 Uniform 0 0.577 -0.228 0.046 -0.313 -0.164
ξn2 Uniform 0 0.577 0.998 0.001 0.997 0.999
σ0τn Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.476 0.019 0.441 0.503
σ4τn Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.018 0.024 0.051
σ8τn Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.032 0.015 0.023 0.044
Capital Tax Shock
ξk1 Uniform 0 0.577 0.605 0.147 0.574 0.999
ξk2 Uniform 0 0.577 0.999 0.144 0.634 0.999
σ0τk Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.923 0.045 0.856 0.997
σ4τk Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.460 0.044 0.386 0.531
σ8τk Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.645 0.046 0.571 0.721
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Table 3.4: Model and Data Moments
Model Data Model Data Model Data
ρ(xt, yt) σ(xt) ρ(xt, xt−1)
∆ log (Yt) 1 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.88 0.28
∆ log (Ct) 0.631 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.21
∆ log (AtIt) 0.89 0.69 0.09 0.02 0.96 0.52
∆ log (At) -0.1792 -0.13 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.49
∆ log (TFPt) 0.1669 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.18
log (Rt) 0.1453 -0.19 0.11 0.01 1.00 0.96
log (Πt) 0.0575 -0.29 0.04 0.01 0.99 0.85
Notes: Time Series xt are the growth rates of output (∆ log (Yt)), consumption (∆ log (Ct)),
investment (∆ log (AtIt)), investment-specific technology (∆ log (At)), TFP (∆ log (TFPt)), the
level of the net nominal interest rate (log (Rt)), and the level of net inflation (log (Πt)).
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Table 3.5: Variance Decomposition of Shocks (in %)
Pref./Wage Markup Technology Policy
ξpref ε0w ε
0
z ε
4,8
z ε
0
x ε
4,8
x ε
0
zI ε
0
a ε
4,8
a ξ
R ε0g ε
0
τn ε
4,8
τn ε
0
τk ε
4,8
τk
4 Periods
GDP 5.00 35.26 24.03 7.98 0.01 0.65 0.27 1.96 2.09 1.48 18.43 0.46 0.00 2.11 0.25
Cons. 18.93 44.73 16.30 11.58 0.02 2.99 0.07 0.87 0.84 0.31 0.05 1.06 0.01 1.49 0.76
Invest. 37.59 17.99 20.53 3.63 0.00 0.00 0.41 7.75 7.91 2.08 0.04 0.09 0.00 1.86 0.12
Hours 3.29 48.73 4.29 7.96 0.03 0.84 0.07 9.48 5.61 4.11 8.91 0.66 0.00 0.13 5.89
Wages 7.39 2.65 50.01 3.35 0.65 0.09 0.12 8.72 5.51 1.71 0.18 0.05 0.00 17.58 1.99
FFR 16.46 2.39 17.85 1.10 0.00 0.20 0.01 5.62 9.99 15.01 0.75 0.00 0.00 29.51 1.11
Infl. 19.15 6.82 25.09 0.53 0.00 0.08 0.03 4.24 8.05 2.04 0.17 0.03 0.00 31.75 2.02
8 Periods
GDP 11.18 35.13 20.52 9.54 0.01 0.68 0.26 1.83 2.75 1.04 12.76 0.44 0.00 2.96 0.90
Cons. 15.94 46.39 16.20 12.43 0.02 3.16 0.08 0.79 0.74 0.26 0.04 1.10 0.01 1.76 1.08
Invest. 41.33 18.32 15.61 5.40 0.00 0.03 0.35 6.19 7.88 1.29 0.02 0.09 0.00 2.76 0.72
Hours 8.78 52.59 6.56 9.78 0.01 0.98 0.13 6.64 5.49 1.78 2.87 0.68 0.00 0.61 3.09
Wages 6.53 2.41 44.66 11.78 0.53 0.52 0.12 7.65 4.77 1.52 0.16 0.05 0.00 15.14 4.15
FFR 21.19 3.23 12.88 0.86 0.00 0.22 0.01 4.50 10.55 5.54 0.42 0.00 0.00 35.54 5.06
Infl. 22.27 7.10 17.80 1.90 0.00 0.07 0.02 3.01 6.82 1.39 0.15 0.03 0.00 31.29 8.14
20 Periods
GDP 21.15 30.89 16.43 9.13 0.01 0.98 0.21 1.58 3.44 0.87 9.89 0.39 0.00 2.89 2.12
Cons. 19.72 44.09 14.88 11.98 0.02 3.14 0.08 0.72 0.84 0.23 0.04 1.06 0.01 1.80 1.37
Invest. 45.16 16.75 12.51 5.79 0.00 0.17 0.28 5.04 8.13 1.07 0.03 0.09 0.00 2.73 2.24
Hours 22.63 50.14 4.20 4.30 0.00 0.25 0.12 5.14 8.29 0.49 0.71 0.67 0.01 1.52 1.52
Wages 6.16 2.26 18.65 8.87 0.20 48.45 0.06 3.00 2.22 0.64 0.06 0.02 0.00 6.08 3.31
FFR 31.49 4.15 5.45 1.94 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.64 5.08 1.53 0.17 0.00 0.00 30.96 17.48
Infl. 31.97 6.27 9.91 3.44 0.00 0.04 0.01 1.74 3.85 0.76 0.10 0.02 0.00 25.83 16.06
Uncond. Variance
GDP 23.57 26.88 12.88 7.67 0.01 0.73 0.19 5.61 11.02 0.66 6.83 0.28 0.00 2.09 1.58
Cons. 24.27 37.52 12.06 9.74 0.01 2.45 0.07 3.75 6.54 0.20 0.04 0.83 0.00 1.43 1.08
Invest. 44.46 15.95 9.61 5.26 0.00 0.14 0.22 7.14 12.98 0.73 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.85 1.56
Hours 46.58 16.62 2.83 2.68 0.00 0.09 0.06 9.97 18.68 0.11 0.15 0.96 0.01 0.67 0.59
Wages 19.01 4.34 13.37 6.78 0.14 32.83 0.05 6.53 9.74 0.45 0.05 0.02 0.00 4.26 2.42
FFR 31.89 1.64 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.46 2.76 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 35.25 26.22
Infl. 31.43 1.69 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34 2.53 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 35.33 26.16
Notes: Variance decompositions are performed at the posterior mean. ε0i represents contemporaneous shock components; ε
4,8
i
represents the sum of the 4 and 8 quarter anticipated shock components. For ease of exposition, we leave out anticipated stationary
investment-specific, wage-markup, and government spending shocks, since these shocks contribute less then 0.01% to the variances of
the variables.
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B Stationary Equilibrium
B Stationary Equilibrium
In order to derive a state-space representation of the model, the model presented
in the main text is solved by using a first-order perturbation method. However, due
to the two integrated processes At and Xt, which grow with rates
µat =
At
At−1
, µxt =
Xt
Xt−1
, (3.24)
the model has to be detrended first in order to induce stationarity and to have a
well-defined steady state. Yt, Ct and Wt inherit the trend XYt = A
α
α−1Xt, which
corresponds to a growth rate of
µyt = (µat )
α
α−1µxt . (3.25)
Kt and It inherit the trend XKt = A
1
α−1Xt and thus grow with
µkt = µIt = (µat )
1
α−1µxt . (3.26)
Gt inherits XGt =
(
XGt−1
)ρxg(
XYt−1
)1−ρxg due to the assumed cointegrated trend with
output. It hence grows with rate
xgt =
(xgt−1)
ρxg
µyt
. (3.27)
The detrending is performed by dividing the trending model variables by their
respective trend. For the estimation of our structural model, these stationary model
variables are matched to the data presented in appendix D.
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C Observation Equation
The observation equation describes how the empirical times series are matched to
the corresponding model variables:33
OBSt =

∆ log (Yt)
∆ log (Ct)
∆ log
(
zItAtIt
)
log (Lt)
∆ log (Gt)
∆ log
(
zItAt
)
∆ log
(
τ kt
)
∆ log (τnt )
∆ log (TFPt)
∆ log (Wt)
∆ log (Rt)
∆ log (Πt)

×100 = −

log (µy)
log (µy)
log (µy)
log
(
L¯
)
log (µy)
log (µa)
log
(
τ k
)
log (τn)
(1− α) log (µx)
log (µy)
log (R)
log
(
Π¯
)

+

yˆt − yˆt−1 + µˆyt
cˆt − cˆt−1 + µˆyt
iˆt − iˆt−1 + zˆIt − zˆIt−1 + µˆyt
Lˆt
gˆt − gˆt−1 + xˆgt − xˆgt−1 + µˆyt
µˆat + zˆIt − zˆIt−1
τˆ kt
τˆnt
zˆt − zˆt−1 + (1− α)µˆxt
wˆt + wˆt−1 + µˆy
Rˆt
Πˆt

,
where ∆ denotes the temporal difference operator, L¯ denotes the steady state of
hours worked, µy is the steady state growth rate of output34, µa is the steady state
growth rate of the relative price of investment, τ k and τn are the steady state tax
rates, TFPt = ztX1−αt is total factor productivity, and R is the steady state interest
rate. The hats above the variables denote log deviations from steady state.
33The equation for Lt follows from
logLt = log
(
Lt
L¯
L¯
)
≈ Lˆt + log L¯.
The equation for government spending follows from
log Gt
Gt−1
= log gtX
g
t
gt−1X
g
t−1
= log gtx
g
tX
Y
t
gt−1x
g
t−1X
Y
t−1
= log gtx
g
t
gt−1x
g
t−1
µyt .
Note that the presence of xg also implies that there is no perfect linear restriction between
the GDP components following from the resource constraint. Hence, we do not need to add
additional measurement error.
34This is also the growth rate of the individual components of GDP along the balanced growth
path.
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D Data Construction
Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s
NIPA Tables and available in quarterly frequency from 1955Q1 until 2006Q4.
• Capital and labor tax rates: Our approach to calculate average tax rates
closely follows Mendoza et al. (1994), Jones (2002), and Leeper et al. (2010).
We first compute the average personal income tax rate
τ p = IT
W + PRI/2 + CI ,
where IT is personal current tax revenues (Table 3.1 line 3), W is wage and
salary accruals (Table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietor’s income (Table 1.12 line
9), and CI ≡ PRI/2 + RI + CP + NI is capital income. Here, RI is rental
income (Table 1.12 line 12), CP is corporate profits (Table 1.12 line 13), and
NI denotes the net interest income (Table 1.12 line 18).
The average labor and capital income tax rates can then be computed as
τn = τ
p(W + PRI/2) + CSI
EC + PRI/2 ,
where CSI denotes contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.1
line 7), and EC is compensation of employees (Table 1.12 line 2), and
τ k = τ
pCI + CT + PT
CI + PT ,
where CT is taxes on corporate income (Table 3.1 line 5), and PT is property
taxes (Table 3.3 line 8).
• Government spending: Government spending is the sum of government
consumption (Table 3.1 line 16) and government investment (Table 3.1 line 35)
divided by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional
population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
• Total factor productivity (TFP): The construction of TFP closely follows
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Beaudry and Lucke (2010), i.e.
TFPt =
Yt
KαH1−α
.
To construct K, we use data on capital services for the private non-farm business
sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor Productivity
Tables),35 multiply it by the total capacity utilization rate (Federal Reserve
System, Statistical Release G.17 - Industrial Production and Capacity Utiliza-
tion), and divide it by the civilian noninstitutional population above 16 years
of age (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q). Real GDP per capita Y is nominal GDP
(Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deflator (line 1 in Table 1.1.4) and
the population, and per capita hours H are non-farm business hours worked
(BLS, Series PRS85006033) divided by the population. The capital share α is
set at 0.2935, the mean over the sample compiled by the BLS (Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor Productivity Tables).
• Relative price of investment: The relative price of investment is taken from
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011). They base their calculations on Fisher (2006).
• Output: Nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deflator
(Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series
LNU00000000Q).
• Investment: Sum of Residential fixed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 12) and
nonresidential fixed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 9) divided by the GDP deflator
(Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series
LNU00000000Q).
• Consumption: Sum of personal consumption expenditures for nondurable
goods (Table 1.1.5 line 5) and services (Table 1.1.5 line 6) divided by the GDP
deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS,
Series LNU00000000Q).
35Quarterly data is interpolated from the annual series using cubic spline interpolation.
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• Real wage: Hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector (BLS, Series
PRS85006103) divided by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
• Inflation: Computed as the log-difference of the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4
line 1).
• Nominal interest rate: Geometric mean of the effective Federal Funds Rate
(St.Louis FED - FRED Database, Series FEDFUNDS).
• Hours worked: Nonfarm business hours worked (BLS, Series PRS85006033)
divided by the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q)
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